The government’s position paper on the report of the Constitutional Review Committee, 2025, has moved the policy conversation from debating how Proportional Representation (PR) might fit within Ghana’s electoral system to considering concrete constitutional measures for addressing political exclusion. The government agrees to implement PR, with twenty-four (24) reserved seats within a three hundred (300) member parliament. I have mixed reactions to the government’s position on PR. I welcome the possibilities it creates for advancing political inclusion, but I am also concerned about the ambitions that fall short of what this reform moment could achieve.  

On one hand, the government has taken a bold step by moving beyond the Committee’s call for further studies to signal its readiness to pursue constitutional quotas. This decision by government must be applauded. Further studies on PR, as recommended by the Review Committee, while useful, could have delayed political decision-making and action to expand opportunities for politically disadvantaged groups, particularly women, to participate meaningfully in the governance of our country.

Comparative studies, alongside Ghana’s own democratic experience, have shown that institutional features of electoral systems can either facilitate or constrain the political participation of women and other marginalized groups. Scholarship (Lijphart, 1999; Norris, 2004; Krook, 2010, 2020) shows that proportional representation systems are not only generally associated with more inclusive legislatures, but also that they can be adapted to different constitutional and political systems. This body of research identifies a range of proportional representation models that coexist with both presidential and parliamentary forms of government. This suggests that, for countries such as Ghana, considering proportional representation does not necessarily imply abandoning the existing presidential system but rather rethinking how legislative representation can be made more inclusive of women.

Now, here is where my disappointment lies. The proposal to cap Parliament at 300 seats, with only 24 reserved for women and other politically disadvantaged groups to compete for among themselves, appears to be a missed opportunity to use this constitutional reform moment to fundamentally reshape political participation and representation in Ghana. The introduction of reserved seats is undoubtedly an important and bold step the government has made. But the reality is that these numbers are not significant enough to change the  entrenched exclusion faced by women.

Look at the numbers. Even in the best-case scenario where women secured all 24 reserved seats, and assuming they maintained their current 40 constituency seats, women would occupy only 64 of 300 seats in Parliament. And because the reserved seats are intended for women and other politically disadvantaged groups, there is no guarantee that women would secure all 24. This is where the ambition of the proposal deserves closer scrutiny. If constitutional reform presents a rare opportunity to address structural inequalities in political representation, should we settle for an arrangement that leaves women still significantly underrepresented? At this pace, Ghana may have begun the journey towards gender parity in governance, but it would still be taking the long route.

The discussion of the proposed PR should be understood within Ghana’s broader affirmative action agenda. PR in itself is not an affirmative action measure. However, when it is designed to reserve political opportunities for women and other historically excluded groups, it becomes an important institutional mechanism for advancing affirmative action. In this sense, the proposed constitutional quotas and the Affirmative Action (Gender Equity) Act, 2024 (Act 1121) should be viewed as one project as they address the persistence of institutional and structural barriers that prevent women from participating in political governance equally with men.  The two reforms nevertheless intervene at different levels. While Act 1121 establishes a broader legal framework for advancing gender equity, constitutional reform provides an opportunity to redesign the electoral rules through which political representation is produced.

In this way, we can see PR as operationalising affirmative action. However, it addresses only one part of structural exclusion and must therefore be complemented by reforms in other parts of our political system. These, I examine in the ensuing sections.

Affirmative Action: the promise and limits

The passage of Act 1121 represents a significant milestone towards gender equality in governance. Act 1121 provides an important legal framework for addressing gender inequality in a more deliberate, coordinated and systematic manner. Its enactment was therefore celebrated as a historic achievement, and gender equality advocates continue to work towards the passage of the accompanying Legislative Instrument required to give practical effect to its provisions.

The optimism around the passage of  Act 1121 co-exists with a lingering sense of dissatisfaction. Why? Although Act 1121 provides an important foundation for advancing gender equality, some of the more transformative proposals capable of confronting the structural barriers to women’s political inclusion did not survive the negotiation process. Provisions that could have required political parties to establish clearer routes for women to enter leadership structures, compete for elected office and rise to senior decision-making positions were weakened or omitted. For example, provisions on mandatory quotas for women within political parties were unsuccessful.

The argument for quotas is sometimes wrongly portrayed as an attempt to offer women an easy or undeserved route into political power. This misrepresents both the problem and the purpose of affirmative action. The issue is not that women lack agency and the competence to lead, nor is it about lowering standards for them to access positions of authority. The issue is rather that the political system we practice is not a level playing field. Its rules, practices and resource structures have long been shaped in ways that advantage men and restrict women’s opportunities to participate, compete and advance. Evidence from the literature shows that women, unlike men, frequently encounter barriers including unequal access to campaign financing, limited control over party structures (Bauer & Darkwah 2024), violence and harassment (Cheesman & Dodsworth, 2019), care responsibilities and exclusion from the informal networks through which political opportunities are often negotiated.

Where women and men are treated equally in such an unequal system, you only preserve the advantages enjoyed by men who dominate political institutions.

Quotas are stop-gap measures that correct and interrupt exclusion and redistribute political opportunities. They serve the purpose of removing systemic obstacles and broadening access to political opportunities for women. They seek to level the playing field, not tilt it.

The unfinished agenda of Act 1121 is to address the institutions that serve as the principal gateways to political power, particularly political parties. Political parties are not simply vehicles for electoral competition. They are the principal gateways through which political leadership is produced. They determine candidate selection, allocate campaign resources, cultivate leadership pipelines and decide who contests constituencies with realistic prospects of success. As long as these institutions remain largely unchanged, legislative reforms alone will have only a limited impact on women’s representation.

Looking back to move forward: lessons from Nkrumah’s affirmative action

One of the misconceptions surrounding affirmative action is that it represents a recent or foreign policy transfer. Ghana’s own political history tells a different story. The principle of taking deliberate state action to correct historical inequalities has long formed part of Ghana’s governance tradition.

Indeed, Tsikata (2009) traces the evolution of affirmative action in Ghana across different generations and shows that successive governments have adopted targeted measures to address various forms of exclusion. Seen from this perspective, Act 1121 is less a departure from Ghana’s political history than a continuation of a longstanding tradition of using deliberate policy measures to address exclusion.

The most compelling historical example is the leadership of Ghana’s first President, Dr. Kwame Nkrumah. In 1960, recognising the underrepresentation of women in political decision-making, Nkrumah’s government enacted the Representation of the People (Women Members) Act, 1960 (Act 47) (Manuh, 1993; Adomako-Ampofo & Ataborah, 2024,) The legislation created reserved seats that enabled ten women to be elected to the National Assembly for the first time in Ghana’s history. This was both an act of political symbolism and deliberate recognition that formal equality alone would not produce inclusive representation where structural barriers prevented women from competing on equal terms with men. Nkrumah understood a lesson that remains relevant today namely that when institutions consistently produce exclusion, governments have a responsibility to redesign those institutions rather than wait for inequalities to correct themselves.

More than six decades later, Ghana continues to confront many of the same challenges that prompted Nkrumah’s intervention. Women remain underrepresented in Parliament, local government and leadership within political parties. The persistence of these disparities suggests that the structural barriers identified in 1960 have not disappeared. They may have evolved and demand new and evolving strategies to fix them.

As we discuss the opportunities presented by constitutional reform, it is important to revisit some proposals and political interventions from the past that sought to advance women’s representation but were not sustained or fully institutionalised. These efforts remain relevant and should be pursued alongside constitutional reforms.

• Encourage political parties to voluntarily adopt internal gender quotas

Political parties are gatekeepers to political office. They determine who is nominated, how campaign resources are distributed and who rises through party leadership structures. I believe no meaningful improvement in women’s political representation can occur without reforms within political parties themselves. Voluntary quotas can allow parties to go above constitutional quotas. Such quotas may require that a minimum proportion of leadership positions, parliamentary candidacies or appointments within party structures be reserved for women. Countries such as Sweden, South Africa and the UK illustrate typologies of voluntary party quotas. Sweden operates strong internal party commitments to gender inclusive candidate lists (Dahlerup & Freidenvall, 2011). Dominant political parties in South Africa have institutionalized gender representation (Preece & Nielson, 2013) and in the UK, parties adopt women only candidate selection in particular constituencies. Ghana’s experience with voluntary party quotas ahead of the 2016 elections illustrates both their potential and their limitations. The leadership of the New Patriotic Party (NPP) proposed an affirmative action measure under which its sixteen (16) incumbent female MPs would be challenged only by female aspirants in the party’s parliamentary primaries. The proposal was protested by the party members and was eventually reversed. This experience highlights the vulnerability of voluntary quotas to competing political interests and internal party pressures. Where voluntary quotas are not institutionalized within party rules and structures, their implementation is undermined. For voluntary quotas to work, they must gain legitimacy among party members and have capacity to withstand internal political pressures. Where a political party adopts and implements voluntary quotas, it demonstrates its commitment beyond legal compliance and helps normalise women’s leadership within its structures, making it easier for it to conform to broader constitutional reforms.

• Government and political parties to adopt gender-responsive political and campaign financing

Government could use political financing to incentivize political parties to open political opportunities for women and ensure that women have the financial means to take advantage of those opportunities and compete effectively. Public funding for political parties could be tied to measurable commitments to women’s political participation, where it rewards parties that nominate women and achieve meaningful levels of women’s representation. At the same time, political parties can deliberately provide financial support to women candidates to reduce the cost-related barriers they face in contesting elections. Currently, both major political parties, the New Patriotic Party (NPP) and the National Democratic Congress (NDC) have some forms of financial support for women, for example, reduced filing fees for party parliamentary primaries. These existing measures could be expanded to cover electoral cycle by providing targeted assistance for campaign materials, constituency outreach and other legitimate campaign expenses or through dedicated financial support mechanisms for women candidates.

• Government should adopt and implement gender targets for ministerial and other public appointments

Parliament is only one arena where political power is exercised. Ministers and deputy ministers, boards and governing councils of state institutions, local government leadership and other senior public offices exercise considerable influence over policy priorities, public expenditure and the allocation of national resources. Establishing clear and ambitious gender targets for these appointments would therefore provide another route for accelerating women’s participation in governance. The considerable discretion surrounding political appointments and opaque selection processes and the absence of strong mechanisms for enforcing voluntary commitments could weaken the effectiveness of gender targets. Gender targets should therefore be accompanied by transparent appointment criteria, monitoring and public reporting mechanisms, including compliance with the Affirmative Action (Gender Equity) Act. 

Conclusion

Constitutional reforms consolidate political innovations that have already been tested through legislation, institutional practice and voluntary commitments. We do not, therefore, face a choice between constitutional reform and complementary actions. We need both. Constitutional, political and institutional reforms in support of gender balance in political governance is a big win for Ghana. May our political leaders have the courage to pursue the ambition of these reforms, our political parties the commitment to open their doors more widely to women, and our public institutions the determination to translate the promise of gender equality into the everyday practice of Ghanaian democracy.

 By Eunice Racheal Agbenyadzi