

2018

PROLIFERATION OF NEW DISTRICTS AND CONSTITUENCIES IN GHANA

THE MISMATCH BETWEEN POLICY
OBJECTIVES, OUTCOMES AND IMPACTS

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AR	Ashanti Region
BAR	Brong-Ahafo Region
CDD	Centre for Democratic Development
C.I.	Constitutional Instrument
CPP	Convention People's Party
CR	Central Region
DA	District Assembly
DACF	District Assembly Common Fund
DCE	District Chief Executive
DHIMS	District Health Information Management System
DLT	District League Table
EC	Electoral Commission
ER	Eastern Region
EU	European Union
FOAT	Functional and Organisational Assessment Tool
GAR	Greater Accra Region
GPRS I	Ghana Poverty Reduction Strategy I (2003-2005)
GPRS II	Ghana Poverty Reduction Strategy II (2005-2009)
GSGDA I	Ghana Shared Growth and Development Agenda I (2010-2013)
GSGDA II	Ghana Shared Growth and Development Agenda II (2014-2017)
HDI	Human Development Index
HIPC	Highly Indebted Poor Country
IDEG	Institute for Democratic Governance
IGF	Internally Generated Funds
LaNMMA	La- Nkwantanang Madina Municipal Assembly
LI	Legislative Instrument
LGA	Local Government Authority
MDA	Ministries, Departments and Agencies
MMDA	Metropolitan, Municipal and District Assembly

MMDCE	Metropolitan, Municipal and District Chief Executive
MP	Member of Parliament
NDC	National Democratic Congress
NDPC	National Development Planning Commission
NPP	New Patriotic Party
NR	Northern Region
OLS	Ordinary Least Squares
PCA	Principal Component Analysis
PNC	People's National Convention
PNDC	Provisional National Defence Council
Sq.km	Squared kilometres
SSA	Sub-Sahara Africa
UER	Upper East Region
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UWR	Upper West Region
VR	Volta Region
UWR	Western Region

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The overall aim of the report was to investigate the extent to which the rationale and mandate prompting the creation of districts and constituencies were fulfilled. The study observed the impact of demarcation of districts on development and the effect of demarcation of constituencies on representation in parliament. Also, an analysis on the possible linkage between creation of new districts and the creation of new constituencies was carried out as a means of observing the presence of possible gerrymandering.

Demarcation of constituencies in this context connotes the partition of a nation in order for the interests of citizens to be represented in Parliament. In Ghana's Local Governance context, demarcation in Ghana is purportedly used as a means of dividing the country into smaller, "manageable" units to fast-track the provision of public services to citizens.

Previous studies in other jurisdictions have shown varied effects of decentralisation on service delivery. In Italy, Spain and Norway, Mosca (2016) found that decentralised systems of governance are not necessarily the most efficient means of delivering services, as scarce resources are not always managed effectively. Contrarily, in countries such as Indonesia, Morocco and Thailand, where there is an emphasis on the proper management of scarce resources, decentralised forms of governance are said to have improved local access to services (Smoke, 2001; World Bank 1995; Manor 1999; Rondinelli *et al.* 1983).

In Ghana, a number of demarcation exercises have taken place over the past two decades, creating both new districts and new constituencies, in, 2004, 2008 and 2012. The creation of districts and constituencies are not supposed to be linked, given that there are separate entities involved and the objectives for their creation are different. However in reality, past occurrences have revealed that both have been created in the same year usually in election years creating an impression that the creation of districts cast their shadows on constituency demarcations. The Electoral Commission of Ghana have the responsibility of reviewing constituency boundaries and can offer the Executive recommendations on the review of district boundaries. Although the connection between creations has led to suspicions in the public sphere of gerrymandering, the Supreme Court have, in 2004 and 2012, ruled that the Electoral Commission was justified in the creation of constituencies and the viability of those new constituencies to contest for parliamentary seats in those years.

This paper assesses three main objectives. The first objective analyses whether the creation of constituencies can/have be/been manipulated by the approach used in creating districts. This was assessed using qualitative research methods and by seeking opinions of experts in the fields of local governance, law, political parties, Civil Society Organisations and the Electoral Commission. Research found that there appears to be a link between the creation of districts and the subsequent creation of constituencies. Perceptions from those interviewed and the general recommendations were that the number of constituencies and/or districts should be maintained or gapped. Also, there is the need to amend some provisions in the law that accounts for the connection between district and constituency creation.

The second objective investigated the possible correlation between development and the creation of districts through two quantitative means. Firstly, regressions were run with data from all 216 districts in the country. The dependent variables were the literacy rate and health, acting as indicators for the level of development. The independent variables in the regression were the population of the districts, the Internally Generated Funds, (IGF) the amount of District Assembly Common Fund they received, an indicator of governance, and a dummy variable, showing the effects on the districts created after 2004. Results of the regression revealed, that while all variables had an effect on development, only IGF and the dummy for the districts created after 2004 were statistically significant in the model used.

The other aspect of the analysis of objective two, case studies of ten metropolitans, municipalities, and districts (MDAs), were used. These MDAs were a mixed sample of those created before 2004 and those created after 2004, 2008 or 2012. Surveys were taken from 200 people in each district, asking for their perspective of the progress made in development in their districts since 2004. Questions related to education and health sectors, and included whether the quality of education had improved, whether access to education had improved, whether health facilities were adequately equipped and whether there had been an increase in the number of health facilities in their area. Secondary data from implementing agencies in the districts, such as the District Education Directorate, District Assemblies, and District Health Directorates, was also collected. The secondary data was used to buttress the opinions of the citizens on the level of development in their communities from 2004 to 2016. The results of the analysis were diverse, with almost equal numbers of respondents agreeing and disagreeing that the quality of education had improved

in their districts. A large number of respondents (32 percent) were indifferent about whether the access to education had improved since 2004. For health, the most common opinion of respondents (46 percent) was that health facilities in their areas were not adequately equipped. Based on the data collected for this part of the analysis of objective 2, there is not enough evidence to suggest that the creation of new districts in 2004 led to the perception of increased development.

The third objective of this study analyses the extent to which the Members of Parliament (MPs) of the new constituencies created following the creation of districts in 2004, had fulfilled their mandate to represent their communities. This was measured by assessing whether MPs had successfully lobbied the National Government through Ministers' question time, the number of public statements they made on the floor of Parliament, and the participation in the Government Assurances Committee, amongst other parliamentary tools. The conclusion of the results of this objective were that it is unclear whether an increase in the number of MPs necessarily improves the quality of representation.

A number of recommendations were suggested due to the results of the study. Firstly, there is a need for more transparency regarding the process of district creation and demarcation. The report also highlighted that there are some grey areas in the law regarding demarcation. This includes the fact that an MP, as an ex-officio member of an MDA, cannot belong to more than one, forces the creation of new constituencies. Since the roles of MPs are not closely linked to the roles of districts, the report recommends that stipulations like this be abolished. Additionally, the Electoral Commission should not feel forced to create new constituencies just because new districts have been created. It was suggested, that since the law does not specifically call for the creation, boundaries should be reviewed and redemarcated if necessary. Similarly, it was also recommended that additional districts need not be created; if the population of a district has grown, rather than dividing it, the district should be elevated to municipality or metropolitan status. Finally, more MPs should be given the opportunity to contribute in the legislative process.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This report has been authored by a multidisciplinary team of researchers comprising Keshia Osei-Kufuor (IMANI AFRICA), Festus Akuetteh Ankrah (IMANI AFRICA), Constance Ababio (IMANI AFRICA) and Ernest Nii Ashitey Armah (Odekro PI).

Brian Dzansi (Independent Researcher), Patrick Stephenson (IMANI AFRICA), Elvis Ayeh (IMANI AFRICA), Victor Osei Kwadwo (UNU-MERIT), Lolan Segoe -Moses (Odekro PI) and Gift Mensah (Odekro PI) supported the research process.

We would like to thank the followings individuals and organisations, who facilitated and advised our fieldwork and secondary data collection: Metropolitan, Municipal and District Assemblies (MMDAs), Ghana Police Service, Ghana Education Service, Ghana Health Service, Community Water and Sanitation Agency, Oxford Research Group, Data Enumerators, New Patriotic Party (NPP), National Democratic Congress (NDC), Convention People's Party (CPP), Institute for Democratic Governance (IDEG), Parliament of Ghana, The Center for Democratic Development (CDD- Ghana), United Nations Children Fund (UNICEF) Legal and Constitutional Law Experts and Local Governance Expert.

We are grateful to all the participants of the survey from whom we learnt during the course of this work.

The study was funded by STAR-GHANA. The views expressed are those of the authors and does not necessarily reflect those of STAR-GHANA.

The research was conducted between June, 2016 and May 2018, and the report does not necessarily reflect subsequent developments.

1.1 INTRODUCTION

Decentralised systems of governance have, over the past four decades, been premised on the pitfalls associated with centralised political, administrative and fiscal systems of governance and on the assumption that genuine forms of decentralisation¹ will encourage transparency, accountability and probity in the manner in which national and local resources are managed for the benefit of all sections of the population (World Bank, 1994; Khaleghian, 2004; Conyer, 2007). While this popular belief remains the dream of devolutionists, both cross-sectional and longitudinal studies about the prospects of decentralisation have shown different results, particularly with regards to its impact on growth, good governance and poverty reduction (Andres & Gill, 2010; Mitullah, 2004a; Grindle, 2004). As a result, scholars of the quality of decentralisation have raised the question of whether it is important to focus on how governments deliver their promise of achieving inclusive growth and development rather than what they actually deliver to the people (Cherron *et al.* 2013).

Drawing from the experiences of Italy, Spain and Norway, Mosca (2006) attempted an explanation for the single most important question: whether indeed decentralisation is the real solution to improving efficiency in the delivery of services to local people by state institutions? Her empirical analysis led to the conclusion that decentralised systems of governance do not, per se, offer plausible means of effective delivery of services, except when accompanied by a clear definition of roles, complete devolution of power and resources devoid of absolute or relative political interference. Recently, however, both the realistic and idealistic views of decentralisation have vocalised their criticism of the rise in regional authorities, as they believe interest representation is the only way to promote bottom-up participation and bring central government closer to the local people. Greenwood (2011) wrote on interest representation in the European Union (EU) and agreed with others (see Mosca, 2006; Wallis & Oates, 1988) that, although interest representation is a precondition for assessing good governance, it encourages unnecessary wastage of public resources, especially when highly politicised.

Of particular interest to developing economies and democratic states is the effective management of scarce resources vis-à-vis promoting local participation in decision making through

¹ For definition and forms of decentralization, see Rondinelli *et al.* (1983) and UNDP-Government of Germany (1999).

decentralised systems of government. Founded on the principle of subsidiarity², empirical evidence based on country experiences show that the most effective form of decentralisation is when governance is kept small in size and capacity building among local institutions is viewed as an incremental process to support revenue mobilisation (Rondinelli *et al.* 1983:4). This implies that extensive institutionalisation of sub-national, semi-autonomous and local government agencies is not necessarily the best approach to ensuring good governance, especially where scarce resources matter the most.

For instance, in countries such as Papua New Guinea, Indonesia, Morocco, Thailand, Colombia, Philippines and Tunisia, decentralised systems have been observed to have improved local access to central government resources and enhanced government responsiveness to service delivery and infrastructure. In these countries, emphasis has been placed on prudent management of scarce resources rather than mere deconcentration and delegation of central government authorities (Smoke, 2001; World Bank 1995; Manor 1999; Rondinelli *et al.* 1983). In Bolivia, for example, Faguet (2004) studied the relationship between decentralisation and government responsiveness to local needs using different estimation models to test the impact of central government investments in social services and human capital across 311 municipalities. The study showed significant positive outcomes in infrastructure and social services where decentralised investment was duly concentrated in locally identified highest-priority projects.

Writing on ‘The Politics of Municipal Fragmentation in Ghana’, Mohammed (2015) pinned the cost-benefit and efficiency of decentralised systems of government on the two fundamental and theoretical bases of amalgamation and fragmentation. The study agreed with Schoburg (2010) and Aulich (2011) that amalgamation of smaller districts into larger political units of municipalities and metropolis is cost effective, creates greater opportunities for revenue mobilisation, and increases responsiveness, while also reducing representational cost. This, supposedly, had been the motivation for countries like Australia and New Zealand where amalgamation of smaller districts has improved the planning, coordination and responsiveness of local government structures. On the other hand, those who believe in fragmented decentralised systems of

² A social principle that states that decision making should be handled by the lowest and least centralized units. This is to ensure that decision making process are taken as closely as possible to the citizen in order to assess whether action at Community level is justified in the light of the prospects available at national, regional or local level.

government argue that smaller units of local government bodies create opportunities for improved service delivery and innovation while allowing for diversity and democratic choice (Ayee, 2008; Warner, 2012). Nevertheless, Mohammed (2015) while examining the local government fragmentation in Ghana from 1988 to 2014 concluded that there was evidence to show that fragmented local government systems often struggle to survive and are confronted with the problem of revenue mobilisation which, in itself is a key determinant for local service delivery in terms of provision of infrastructure and social services.

The question that resonates from these two debates is, given Ghana's already fragmented decentralised system of governance, which stems from the proliferation of district assemblies, coupled with its attendant representation and administrative costs, will continued creation of new districts and constituencies be cost effective? In summary, the failure of decentralised systems of governance around the world can be attributed to poor planning and the institutionalisation of local government authorities, limited devolution of power and resources as well as continual central government interference in the allocation of resources – a situation that mostly results in disloyalty, apathy, abuse of state resources, shared conflict of interests and looting of the public purse (Samoff, 1990). It is against this backdrop that this report seeks to provide a systemic analysis of the mismatch between policy objectives, outcomes and impact of the proliferation of new districts and constituencies in Ghana's quest to deepen decentralisation and democratic governance. This report aims to offer empirical evidence that will either support or reject the proliferation of districts and constituencies. The intent is not to negate past efforts made to deepen decentralisation and democracy in the country. Rather, it aims to provide literature and a reference guide for future attempts of demarcation.

1.2 THE RATIONALE AND LEGAL OR CONSTITUTIONAL BASIS INFORMING THE NEED FOR THIS PROJECT

The aim of the project is to use the information collected to assess the actual impact of the creation of new districts, since 2004, on development outcomes, and the effectiveness of Parliamentary representation in 10 constituencies created in 2004. The creation of administrative districts, and the subsequent creations of parliamentary constituencies by the Electoral Commission (EC), since

2004 has been a point of controversy. This is due to the ambiguous processes used for the creations, suspicions of political linkages, and questions surrounding the achievement of their mandate.

In 2004, the large and populous districts, which constituted single-member constituencies were split and the smaller administrative units were automatically converted into constituencies by the EC. This raised the membership of parliament from 200 to 230.

It will be recalled that the creation of these new constituencies in the 2004 elections caused considerable controversy. The EC's decision was challenged by the minority political parties, who believed that the newly created constituencies should not be contestable in the then upcoming Parliamentary elections. However, the late Chief Justice George Kingsley Acquah delivered the unanimous opinion of the Supreme Court that the Constitutional provisions in **Article 47(1) and 47(6)** are unambiguous (Ghanaweb, 2004). The effect of this decision was the inclusion of the newly created constituencies in the parliamentary elections.

In 2012, this cycle repeated itself. The Electoral Commission laid **C.I 78** before Parliament, which created 45 additional constituencies. Notwithstanding the recommendation of the bipartisan subsidiary legislation committee that the Parliament should reject the C.I because it failed to align newly created constituencies with administrative districts, the instrument received Parliament's blessing. The practical import of this decision is that Ghana now has more electoral constituencies than administrative districts. Though the Supreme Court ruled on the legal challenges to the EC's demarcation exercises, the objections raised by minor political parties and by the committee on subsidiary legislation remain an issue worth examining.

These objections seem to be born out of the fear that a) the Executive, at some point in the past, "manipulated" the E.C, to use the demarcation of new constituencies to create electoral strongholds for itself and the possibility of such incidence to reoccur, and b) the possibility of the creation of new constituencies to lead to an asymmetry between constituencies and districts resulting in the maladministration and underdevelopment of large parts the country.

These fears are grounded in the following legal facts and political realities:

1.2.1 The Executive's De-Facto control of the Electoral Commission

The President has the power to appoint all Commissioners of the Electoral Commission (**Article 43 of the 1992 constitution using Article 70 procedure**). The President's nominee is not vetted by Parliament or any other body, giving the President the liberty to choose whosoever he/she thinks is fit for the job. It is quite unlikely that a politician will appoint electoral commissioners who are not in the least favourable to his/ her party's interests. Secondly, the Executive controls the EC's operational budget as said budget is charged on the Consolidated Fund (**Article 54**), which is administered and controlled by the Executive. There have been instances where the budget of the EC has been slashed by Parliament and such actions propelled the EC to reduce the number of polling stations slated for an impending presidential elections by 1000 (Ghanaweb, 2015). Lastly, Parliament, which the EC must lay its Constitutional Instruments before, has been controlled by the same political party as the Executive in every government under the 4th Republic.

1.2.2 Lack of Clarity in the Demarcation Process

The current powers of the EC to demarcate new constituencies and the process through which it does so are laid out in **Article 47 (1) - (7)** of the Constitution. The Constitution states that:

- **Article 47 (3)** *"The boundaries of each constituency shall be such that the number of inhabitants in the constituency is, as nearly as possible, equal to the population quota."*
- **Article 47 (7)** *"For the purposes of this article, "population quota" means the number obtained by dividing the number of inhabitants of Ghana by the number of constituencies into which Ghana is divided under this article."*
- **Article 47 (4)** *"For the purposes of clause (3) of this article, the number of inhabitants of a constituency may be greater or less than the population quota in order to take account of means of communication, geographical features, density of population and area and boundaries of the regions and other administrative or traditional areas."*
- **Article 47 (5)** *"The Electoral Commission shall review the division of Ghana into constituencies at intervals of not less than seven years, or within twelve months after the*

publication of the enumeration figures after the holding of a census of the population of Ghana, whichever is earlier, and may, as a result, alter the constituencies.”

- **Article 51** specifies that the Electoral Commission shall create new constituencies and carry out other functions through Constitutional Instruments.

According to **Article 11(7)** these Constitutional Instruments shall come into force 21 days after being laid in Parliament and gazetted if Parliament does not reject them by a two thirds of the votes cast.

Though these provisions seem clear, it is unclear to what extent **Articles 47(3) and 47(4)** of the Constitution must align or be reconciled. The constitution gives the EC the power to demarcate constituencies according to the population quota with the option of taking into account means of communication, geographical features and other practical factors which are necessary to ensure the sound governance and development of the constituencies. There are currently several constituencies which are above or below the population quota. In all these cases it was unclear, at the time of their creation and still remains unclear :

- a. Whether the EC demarcated the constituencies based solely based on population quotas (**47(3)**), “practical factors” (**47(4)**) or some combination of both?
- b. In cases where the constituency demarcations do not satisfy **47(3)** provisions, which “practical factor(s)” (**47(4)**) or combination of “practical factors” the EC used and how it justified/ forecasted their effects on governance and development.

The lack of clarity about the EC’s rationale for and process of constituency demarcation stems from:

- a. The absence of these details in the various C.Is and accompanying documentation which the EC has presented to Parliament.
- b. The speed with which these C.Is are passed before Parliament. The constitution provides for only 21 days for Parliament to formally consider the C.I. Instruments of this nature are typically introduced in election years and in the past, the E.C has failed to engage the public and political parties in broad-based consultation.

We believe the relative ease with which the Executive could potentially control the EC, the secrecy with which the EC has traditionally conducted its affairs and the general nature of the provisions in **Article 47(3)** and **47(4)** of the constitution, lead to much distrust and suspicion in Ghana's constituency demarcation processes. Furthermore, over a period of 10 years and 3 successive Parliaments since **C.I 46**, a Constitutional Instrument (CI) which gave a legal backing for the creation of 30 additional constituencies, there have been no in-depth studies assessing its effect on governance and effective political representation of the newly-created districts.

The other leg of the work, as already established in the introductory part of this report, is the impact of district creation on development. The creation of the districts themselves have also been a subject of discussion for some time now, with many accusing successive governments of gerrymandering. Such accusations have been fueled by the lack of clarity, transparency on the framework for creating the districts, lack of proper consultations, breach of the prerequisite conditions among others. The results of such long standing practices have culminated in people boycotting general and district assembly elections, inter-community conflict, among others, in the past (Gati, 2006) . Successive governments, on the other hand, have justified the proliferation of district creation by indicating that the goal is to fast track development in such areas. In other words, creating new districts will lead to improved service delivery as well as bring development closer to the people.

Given that the EC is enjoined by Article 47(5) of the Constitution to review the number of constituencies every 7 years, we are of the view that the time is ripe to conduct such a study to inform a more systematic and transparent review process in 2019.

This study is being carried out to assess whether the creation of new districts has actually led to development. The intention is to produce evidence which supports or rejects government justification.

1.3 OBJECTIVES

The main objectives of this report are:

1. To analyse the policy used by the Electoral Commission of Ghana in the creation of

parliamentary constituencies (which is often tied to new administrative districts created by the executive) and the possibility for abuse of the system to favor a political party (gerrymandering).

2. To analyse the relationship between the policy objectives and policy outcomes of the creation of new districts.

3. To analyse the degree to which MPs' representation in parliament of the new constituencies created out of new districts in 2004 aligned with their mandate by assessing whether MPs successfully lobbied the National Government through Ministers' question time; Public Statements on the floor of Parliament; the Government Assurances Committee and other Parliamentary tools, to ensure representation and to plug development shortfalls in their districts.

1.4 Research Questions

Some of the questions this study sought to answer include:

1. Are the processes for the creation of parliamentary constituencies abused by the EC, in favour of a political party?
2. Is there any relationship between the objectives for creating new districts and the resulting outcome/result?

2.0 LITERATURE REVIEW

This section attempts to give a retrospective overview of Ghana's District Assemblies' (DAs) concept vis-à-vis constituencies from the post-independence era. Subsequent sections present a trend analysis of the creation of new districts and constituencies with reference to national policy objectives, outcomes and impacts.

Decentralisation is regarded as a means of achieving various development goals, including rural development and national unity through the improved service delivery (Conyers, 1984). The role of decentralisation in development of the country cannot be underestimated in the light of increasing demand for public services delivery as a result of population increase. Economists commonly assume a better match between local government outputs and local preferences under decentralisation, and consequently rate local provision of services as more efficient, unless this situation is outweighed by spillovers or other efficiencies (for example, economies of scale) in central government provision (Oates, 1972).

While studying the politics of local government development, (Wolman and Spitzley, 1996) also emphasised the ability of decentralised systems to improve the economic development process. According to the study, efficiency, governance, and distributive values generated by decentralised governance could lead to economic development by successful service provision. In this regard, by acknowledging the fundamental difference between private enterprise and public sector, the study pointed out the political priority of public welfare service provision. Moreover, the limitations of national governments in fulfilling local needs while prioritising national preferences were identified.

Notwithstanding the theoretical literature on this topic, which overall, shows positive effects of decentralisation on development, the results of many studies do not support the argument of a positive relationship between decentralisation and development in developing countries. These empirical studies, conducted in different socio-economic contexts, have resulted in inconsistent findings. For instance, Lin and Liu (2000), and Zhang and Zou's (1997) works on decentralisation reforms and their impact on economic growth in China provide rather contradictory findings. The study undertaken by Lin and Liu, based on decentralisation reforms in China for the period 1970 to 1993, proved that fiscal decentralisation made a significant contribution to economic growth.

However, the study conducted by Zhang and Zou found that decentralisation reforms in China did not contribute significantly to its economic growth.

2.1 Historical Underpinnings of Ghana's DAs Concept

The first pragmatic attempt to deepen Ghana's democracy through decentralisation in the post-independence era dates back to efforts by the Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC), specifically following a nationwide desire to anchor the country's local government system to a legal framework. This took effect under the Local Government Law of 1988, dubbed PNDC Law 207 and subsequently the Local Government Act of 1993, Act 462. Citing Beetham and Boyle (1995), Crawford (2004) noted that this effort motivated Ghana's quest to achieve two democratic principles, which were to gain popular control over collective decision making and political equality in the exercise of that control through representation. Following the legalisation of the local government system, the number of districts in Ghana were increased from 65 to 110 across the ten administrative regions of Ghana. While some believe the intention was to promote grass-root participation and ownership of the machinery of government, others argue that it was an attempt to do the bidding of donor agencies and at the same time a self-servicing motivation to win political loyalty (Ayee, 1994; Pinkney, 1997; Oquaye, 2001).

Sixty years after independence and over two and a half decades after the legalisation of the local government system, the question that remains unanswered is whether the creation of new districts and constituencies has a self-serving motivation and is a result of a mere political agenda or whether it is really meant to deepen popular participation and good governance. Central to this question has been the continual interference by central government in the appointment of Metropolitan, Municipal and District Chief Executives (MMDCEs), coupled with the lack of financial autonomy for local development. By the provision of the Local Government Act of 1993 (Act 462), no person at any point in time is expected to belong to more than one district assembly in Ghana. Deductively, this provision prevents Members of Parliament (MPs) who are the elected political heads of constituencies from belonging to more than one district assembly, as they are, by law, granted de-facto membership of the various MMDAs (Bening 2012). This consequently has contributed to the creation of new constituencies in instances where the creation of an

additional district by splitting an existing district has led to overlapping boundaries within a particular constituency. A phenomenon that often results in a financial problem for a struggling economy, in which the public sector wage bill alone accounted for 45 percent of total tax revenue as of 2015, at an amount of GH¢10.55 billion instead of the budgeted GH¢10.28 billion (Thebftonline.com, 2015).

2.2 Trend analysis of the creation of DAs and Constituencies vis-à-vis national policy objectives

Between 1992 and 2016, Ghana has had at least five medium term development plans including the first stage of Ghana Vision 2020 (1996-2000), Ghana Poverty Reduction Strategy (2003-2005), Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy (2006-2009), also known as GPRS I & II respectively, and the Ghana Shared Growth and Development Agenda One and Two (GSGDA I & II), 2010-2013 and 2014-2017 respectively (NDPC, 2014). There were five thematic focus areas of Vision 2020. Namely, *human development; economic growth; rural development; urban development; and an enabling environment for poverty reduction*. These thematic areas, according to the Rawlings-led government, were to be achieved through a concerted effort of

1. Institutionalising de-facto vertical and horizontal decentralised systems of government administration to promote community participation,
2. Mobilising the totality of human and financial resources, and
3. Bringing the under-privileged and vulnerable groups into mainstream national development.


In 2000, there was a change of government, in which the John Agyekum Kufour-led New Patriotic Party (NPP) came into office with a new set of national policy objectives, well-documented in the GPRS I. Similar to the previous administration, the NPP led administration sought to create wealth by accelerating poverty reduction and protection of the poor and vulnerable through a decentralised, democratic environment (GPRS I, 2003). As a result, Mohammed (2015) noted that 45 new districts were created, bringing the number of DAs in Ghana from 65 in 1988/89 to 110 before 2004, while the number of constituencies were also increased from 200 in 1992 to 230 as of 2004 (see Figure 1). Deductively, this increase translated to 230 MPs and 110 MMDCEs for a

country that was already declared Highly Indebted Poor Country (HIPC). Given the state of the economy at the time, it was expected that if for nothing at all, the number of districts and constituencies in Ghana would have been maintained in order for the country to focus its resources on investment in infrastructure and productive sectors to expand avenues for job creation, income redistribution and poverty reduction. However, this did not happen.

Following the 2008 general elections, the NPP government lost power to the National Democratic Congress (NDC), first led by the late Professor John Evans Atta Mills' (2009-2012) and later by John Dramani Mahama (2012-2016). By the constitutional requirement in Article 36 clause 5 of the 1992 Constitution of the Republic of Ghana, a new set of medium-term national policy objectives – GSGDA I & II took effect from 2010-2013 and 2014-2017 respectively. These policy objectives were anchored to seven key thematic areas including, *competitive private sector, agriculture modernisation, infrastructure, oil and gas development, and transparent, responsive and accountable governance*. The government at the time acknowledged that the country's decentralised structures had not permeated down to the sub-district level and as a result there was a need to restructure and reconstitute the unit committees to enable them to perform their functions as stipulated under Legislative Instrument (LI) 1589, 1994. Other proposed measures in GPRS I were to delink the Member of Parliament (MP)s' Common Fund from the District Assembly (DA)s' Common Fund by setting up another constituency development fund which was to be resourced from the national Consolidated Fund. Consequently, an additional 45 constituencies and 106 DAs were created though district level figures for the 2010 National Population and Housing Census were yet to be released, therefore bringing the number of MPs and MMDCEs to 275 and 216 respectively as of 2012 (see Figure 1).

Figure 1: Trends in the creation of new districts and constituencies in Ghana, 1992-2012

Figure 1: Trends in the creation of new districts and constituencies in Ghana, 1992-2012




Source: Computed by author based on data from the Electoral Commission³ and Mohammed (2015)

At the regional level, Ashanti region has 47 constituencies, representing an increase of 42.2 percent above the 1992 figure. The region also has about twice the number of constituencies than the Central region and more than three times and four times the numbers that are in the Upper East and Upper West regions respectively (see Figure 2). Similarly, the number of constituencies in the Greater Accra region increased by 54.5 percent over same period, while that of Northern, Upper East, Upper West and Volta increased by 34.8, 25.0, 37.5, and 36.8 percent respectively.

Figure 2: Regional Trends in the creation of New Constituencies, 1992-2012

³ See Electoral Commission 2004; 2008; 2012 Presidential and Parliamentary Elections. Electoral Commission, Accra

Figure 2: Regional Trends in the creation of New Constituencies, 1992-2012



Source: Computed by author based on data from the Electoral Commission⁴ and Mohammed (2015)


With regards to the regional trends in the creation of new DAs between the same period, Figure 3 shows little change in relation to trends in the creation of new constituencies. The Northern region recorded the highest percentage increase of 342 percent over the 1992 figure of 7 DAs, followed by the Western region's 340 percent and the Greater Accra region's 333.3 percent. Although the Upper West region has the least number of DAs, the region recorded 200 percent increase ahead of Ashanti, Eastern and Central region. Given this trend of increase over the last two decades, there is high possibility of a future increase.

This has raised concerns for a country that is already battling a high debt to GDP ratio coupled with excessive pressure for cuts in the public sector wage bill. Other important concerns that emanate from the literature are whether indeed the national policy objectives driving these increases have been achieved, particularly with regards to decentralisation and poverty reduction, inclusive governance and enhanced popular participation, responsiveness to local needs and empowerment of the poor, vulnerable and disadvantaged in society (Yeboah & Obeng-Odoom, 2010; Kyei, 2000; Yankson, 2008). Answers to these questions are examined in the following two sections.

⁴ See Electoral Commission 2004; 2008; 2012 Presidential and Parliamentary Elections. Electoral Commission, Accra

Figure 3: Regional Trends in the Creation of New MMDAs , 1992-2012

Figure 3: Regional Trends in the Creation of New MMDAs, 1992-2012



Source: Computed by author based on data from Ayee (2008) and Mohammed (2015)

*Figures for DAs were before 1992 and 2004 respectively.

2.3 Delimitation of DAs and Constituencies in Ghana – Legal, Economic & Political Issues

Ghana, a country with a total land surface area of 238,533 sq. km has, since the advent of colonial rule, inherited several arbitrary boundaries most of which have succeeded in worsening the country's political, socioeconomic and cultural fragmentation today. Many have argued that perhaps the most disputable contributory factors to this current political and democratic dispensation partly arose from existing artificial boundaries of colonial legacy and also from the country's own legal provisions and selective criteria (Bening, 2012; Commonwealth Secretariat, 2012; Owusu, 2009). In relation to the creation of new constituencies, Article 47 of the 1992 Constitution of the Republic of Ghana mandates the Electoral Commission (EC) to, upon the release of national census data, review possible demarcation and creation of new constituencies bearing in mind geographic and demographic considerations relating to regional boundaries

(Commonwealth Secretariat, 2012). Similarly, the President of the Republic of Ghana, under section 42 of the Local Government Act of 2004, is mandated to exercise discretion over the creation of new DAs where it deems appropriate. According to the Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development (2012), such creation shall take into consideration the community of interest, population size and resource generation capacity with due regards to geographic factors. Bening (2012) notes that, in the case of a district, municipality and metropolis, the minimum population requirement shall be more than 75,000, 95,000 and 250,000 respectively. The Constitution, however, failed to stipulate explicitly the maximum number of constituencies and DAs Ghana must have, except pegging the minimum number of constituencies/MPs to 160 (Commonwealth Secretariat, 2012). In effect, these provisions, according to Mohammed (2015) and Bening (2012), account for the continuous fragmentation in the country's decentralised and democratic systems of governance as well as the series of boundary disputes that have been particularly challenging for internal revenue mobilisation of some DAs throughout the country.

Table 1 indicates that, in the case of the West Mamprusi District, which was created in 1988, the population, as of 2010, was 121,117 which far exceeds the minimum population requirement for a municipality, yet it assumes a status of a district. Whereas, in the case of Adenta, the population as of 2010 was 78,215, which is less than then the required number for a municipality, yet it assumes a municipal status. Similarly, Sissala West, and Twifo Hemang Lower Denkyira districts have populations of less than the minimum required number, yet have assumed district status. These phenomena are not limited to the creation of MMDAs alone. For instance, the Commonwealth Secretariat (2012, p.15) notes that, based on 2012 election results, universal adult suffrage is not equally provided in Ghana because, while the average number of registered voters in constituencies across the country is about 50,000, the smallest constituencies have voter populations of just 12,082, which is ten times lesser compared with 126,659 for the largest constituencies. Clearly, these are simple indications of mere political attempts to proliferate the number of districts and constituencies without due consideration for the law and the associated economic implications it brings to the country.

Table 1: Distribution of population, year established, and constitutionally required population

Name of MMDA	Population	Year Created	Required Pop.
North Tongu District	89,777	2012	75,000 – 95,000
Oforikrom (sub-metro)	303,016	-	-
Asawase (sub-metro)	312,258	-	-
Jaman North District	83,059	2004	75,000 – 95,000
Tamale South (sub-metro)	80,802	-	-
Walewale (West Mamprusi District)	121,009**	1988	75,000 – 95,000
Sissala West District	49,573*	2004	75,000 – 95,000
Adenta Municipal	78,215*	2008	75,000 – 95,000
Hemang Lower Denkyira	55,131*	2012	75,000 – 95,000

*&**Population less and more than minimum required number respectively.

Source: Tabulated by Authors based on data from the District Population and Housing Census Analytical Reports by the Ghana Statistical Service, October, 2014.

2.4 Policy Outcomes and Impacts Regarding the Creation of New DAs and Constituencies

As indicated earlier, framers of decentralised systems of government envision that well-devolved power, authority and resources from the central government to local autonomous bodies will encourage mobilisation and allocation of scarce resources, and encourage popular participation towards the ultimate goal of inclusive development and poverty reduction. This section therefore draws from empirical studies across the country in support of whether or not Ghana's decentralised system of governance has achieved its intended purpose. To begin with, some studies on the impacts of decentralisation in Ghana (Asante, 2003; Asante and Aryee, 2005) show some positive outcomes in relation to provision and delivery of social infrastructure and services, especially water, health, education and feeder roads. For instance, in a study of 12 districts⁵ in Ghana, Aryee

⁵ The 12 districts are Bolgatanga, Bawku East, East Gonja, Wa, Kintampo, Nkoranza, Kwahu South, Akwapim North, Mfantseman, Kommenda-Edina-Eguafo-Abirem, East Nzema and Kpandu.

and Amponsah (2003) found that about 52 percent of their total sample of 3,600 citizens had confidence in their DAs in terms of delivery of social services and infrastructure. Similar conclusions were drawn by Asante (2003) in his economic analysis of decentralisation in rural Ghana. He found that DAs have been very instrumental particularly in the delivery of physical infrastructure. Nevertheless, the authors note that in spite of the few successes, DAs are constrained in several ways including funding, bottom-up participation and planning as well as political interferences. Clearly, these challenges, according to the Economic Commission for Africa (2012), defy the core objective and tenet of decentralisation, which is to encourage popular participation and bottom-up planning. Findings from other studies also reveal that DAs in Ghana have not been responsive to local needs. For instance, Yankson (2008), while studying decentralisation and poverty reduction in the Gomoa District of Ghana using community-based poverty assessment survey instruments, concluded that the assembly had been ineffective in addressing poverty reduction in the communities. Further, the study notes that political rights of the disadvantaged and excluded in society, particularly women, are denied due to excessive elite capture of local political power and resources.

The findings are not different from that of Crawford and Hartmann (2008) based on their case study of decentralisation in Ghana. The authors found that implementation of decentralisation in Ghana is mainly aimed at retaining political power and control over resources and, as a result, had failed in several ways to tackle grass-root poverty which could otherwise be achieved through inclusive participation of the poor. Another study by Kyei (2000) in the Andansi West District in the Ashanti region revealed that district assemblies have not been supportive of self-reliant and people-centered development. He adds that the poor continue to remain voiceless, disempowered, and isolated from the decision-making processes which concern their lives.

Another dimension of the impacts and outcomes resulting from decentralisation and democratic governance, in relation to the creation of new districts and constituencies, hinges on boundary disputes, and, in most cases, degenerate into chieftaincy conflicts (Boone, 2013). A case study of four newly created districts in Ghana by Owusu (2009) showed that such a phenomenon hampers revenue mobilisation by assemblies and simultaneously results in divisions among a once united group. He associated the divisions and series of agitations among the Konkombas with the creation of the East Mamprusi District from the Bunkprugu Yunyo District in the Northern region of Ghana.

A similar incident is observed by Stacey (2014) as being the genesis of the confrontations between the Gonjas and Nawuri tribe following the creation of the Kpandai District from the former East Gonja District in 2008. In the Greater Accra region, the situation is no different. For instance, since its creation in 2012, the La-Nkwantanang Madina Municipal Assembly (LaNMMA) has been encumbered with boundary disputes with adjoining municipalities, especially with the Ga East Municipal Assembly (La Nkwantanang Municipal Assembly, 2016). According to the LaNMMA, the situation is one of the main challenges affecting spatial development and revenue generation in the municipality.

With regards to constituencies, much of the literature on the impact focused on divided political loyalty, while others suggested it created opportunity for extensive exercise of political power and mobilisation of the electorate (Aiyede *et al.* 2013; Electoral Commission of Ghana, 2012; Smith, 2011). Smith (2011) argued that, given the constitutional provision under Article 47(2) of the 1992 Constitution of Ghana, application of the population quota for the creation of new constituencies could enhance effective mobilisation of voters while giving them thorough representation in parliament.

A trend analysis of presidential voting patterns in 10 selected constituencies in Ghana showed that the dominant political parties, namely New Patriotic Party (NPP), and the National Democratic Congress (NDC) have, for the past sixteen years, remained the most favourable political parties among the electoral population (see Table 3). In 2004, the Kufour-led NPP won three out of the ten constituencies chosen for case studies within this study. These include Essikado-Ketan, Hemang Lower Denkyira, and Oforikrom while the NDC managed to win the remaining 7 constituencies with an aggregate percentage vote of 91.09 percent in Central Tongu constituency located in their stronghold region – Volta region. Similar patterns were observed following the presidential run-off voting in 2008. An interesting dynamic of the trend in voting patterns based on the available statistics is that in the case of the NPP, their aggregate percentage votes in Essikado-Ketan and Hemang Lower Denkyira constituencies decreased by 18.36 and 14.78 percent respectively between 2004 and 2012 and increased thereafter by 10.6 and 8.06 percent respectively in the 2016 polls. The NDC, in the same constituencies, managed to increase their aggregate percentage votes by 18.35 and 14.57 percent respectively but decreased thereafter by 11.11 and 9.68 percent in 2016 respectively. In Adenta, the trend was similar for both parties

between 2004 and 2016. In stronghold constituencies of the NDC such as North Tongu, Asawase, and Tamale South, there was an aggregate percentage reduction of presidential votes by 0.77, 1.23, and 4.45 percent respectively between 2004 and 2016. Further, the results showed that generally, aggregate percentage votes for the smaller parties were below 4.0 percent except in Sissala West where the People's National Convention (PNC) and Convention People's Party (CPP) managed to pool 30.06 percent in 2004.

Table 2: Presidential Voting Patterns in Ten (10) Selected Constituencies in Ghana, 2004-2016

Constituency	Party	2004	2008*	2012	2016
Essikado-Ketan (WR)	NPP	25,113 (74.80)	20,656 (60.02)	23,629 (56.44)	27,162 (67.04)
	NDC	7,952 (23.69)	13,758 39.98	17,598 (42.04)	12,530 (30.93)
	Others	508 (1.51)	-	638 (1.52)	824 (2.03)
North Tongu (VR)	NPP	2,019 (6.66)	2,370 (6.97)	2,246 (6.13)	2,778 (8.04)
	NDC	27,594 (91.09)	31,636 (93.03)	34,162 (93.18)	31,315 (90.32)
	Others	681 (2.25)	-	254 (0.69)	567 (1.64)
Hemang Lower Denkyira (WR)	NPP	12,606 (64.05)	10,177 (53.30)	12,844 (49.27)	14,919 (57.33)
	NDC	6,740 (34.25)	8917 (46.70)	12,727 (48.82)	10,185 (39.14)
	Others	335 (1.7)	-	231 (1.91)	498 (3.53)
Adenta (GAR)	NPP	18,714	17,917	31,419	34,548

		(49.19)	(44.39)	(45.57)	(51.06)
	NDC	18,860 (49.58)	22,438 (55.61)	36,451 (53.33)	32,108 (47.46)
	Others	469 (1.23)	-	475 (1.1)	604 (1.48)
Jaman North (BAR)	NPP	9,986 (43.86)	8,614 (37.89)	11,862 (40.81)	13,013 (46.08)
	NDC	12,263 (53.86)	14,118 (62.11)	16,701 (57.46)	14,098 (49.58)
	Others	519 (2.28)	-	502 (1.73)	576 (4.34)
Tamale South (NR)	NPP	12,311 (22.81)	12,958 (21.01)	16,611 (23.33)	19,047 (26.10)
	NDC	40,735 (75.48)	48,711 (78.99)	53,536 (75.19)	51,839 (71.03)
	Others	925 (1.71)	-	1,054 (1.48)	1,163 (2.87)
Oforikrom (AR)	NPP	47,778 (65.84)	45,866 (64.62)	59,817 (65.91)	61,191 (72.68)
	NDC	23,266 (32.06)	25,112 (35.38)	30,202 (33.28)	21,901 (26.01)
	Others	1,519 (2.1)	-	741 (0.81)	740 (1.31)
Asawase (AR)	NPP	31,192 (42.31)	38,357 (57.60)	31,260 (40.67)	33,108 (45.16)
	NDC	40,496	28,235	45,178	39,363

		(54.92)	(42.40)	(58.78)	(53.69)
	Others	2,042 (2.77)	-	424 (0.55)	493 (1.15)
Walewale (NR)	NPP	9,227 (29.14)	15,144 (44.28)	23,546 (53.17)	27,731 (53.74)
	NDC	11,674 (36.87)	19,082 (55.75)	19,241 (43.45)	22,100 (42.83)
	Others	10,761 (33.99)	-	1,497 (3.38)	808 (3.43)
Sissala West (UWR)	NPP	4,785 (31.15)	7,490 (47.69)	7,402 (33.94)	11,107 (47.05)
	NDC	5,959 (38.79)	8,392 (52.84)	12,850 (58.92)	11,393 (48.25)
	Others	4,618 (30.06)	-	20,252 (7.14)	424 (4.7)

Source: Tabulated by author based on data from Ghana Vote. Available at: <http://www.graphic.com.gh/elections/constituency-details/2016/sissala-west>

Values in parenthesis are corresponding percentage values.

*Figures for 2008 are based on presidential run-off.

2.5 Summary

Studies on decentralisation in Ghana and other countries have shown mixed results on the impact of decentralisation on local service provision, revenue mobilisation and development. Constant demarcations of electoral and district boundaries since 1988, coupled with speculative improvements in districts and constituencies, has led to suspicions over the motives for the creations. This study seeks to add to the literature on this topic, giving empirical and qualitative

evidence to the question of whether the mandates of the creation of districts and constituencies have been fulfilled from 2004 to 2016.

3.0 METHODOLOGY

This section provides an outline of research methods that were used for the study. It gives information on the participants, that is, the criteria for inclusion in the study, who participants were and how they were sampled. The instrument that was used for data collection is also described and the procedures that were followed to carry out this study are included. The section also discusses the methods and tools used to analyse the data.

3.1 Research Design

In an attempt to achieve the three stipulated objectives of the study, a mixed method, combining both qualitative and quantitative approaches, was adopted. The qualitative research was used to achieve objective 1 and 3, while the quantitative approach was used to achieve objective 2.

3.1.1 Objective One: To analyse the policy used by the Electoral Commission of Ghana in the creation of parliamentary constituencies (which is often tied to new administrative districts created by the executive) and the possibility for abuse of the system to favour a political party (gerrymandering).

The qualitative research under this objective involved a combination of both desktop literature review and semi-structured interviews with key stakeholders; technical experts, political party representatives, the Electoral Commission, Civil Society Organisations (CSOs), and the Parliament of Ghana. These institutions were chosen as interviewees as each had a vested interest in the creation of constituencies and/or districts; the political parties have the possibility of contesting for additional seats in Parliament, and so increased power; the Electoral Commission is mandated to create constituencies and give recommendations for the creation of districts; since constituencies and districts are the national vehicle for delivering development and democracy to citizens, the Civil Society Organisations are stakeholders in this study as they monitor the progress of democracy, development and human rights in the country; and the Parliament of Ghana is responsible for providing the infrastructure for the new constituencies (such as offices and seats in Parliament for the additional Ministers of Parliament), as well as new maps outlining demarcation in the country. Individuals such as local governance experts and the legal practitioners were chosen for interviews in this study as they had extensive experience in constitutional matters, local

governance/decentralisation and demarcation of districts and constituencies. The data gleaned from the various interviews were analysed qualitatively by comparing the views expressed by these experts to establish areas of dissonance and convergence.

Table 3: List of Institutions and Individuals Interviewed

INSTITUTIONS/STAKEHOLDER	NUMBER OF CONTACT PERSONS
Political Parties	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - National Democratic Congress (NDC)-1 - New Patriotic Party (NPP)-1 - Convention People's Party- 2
Local Government Experts	1
Civil Society Organisation	1
Parliament of Ghana	1
Law Practitioners	2
Electoral Commission of Ghana	2

Source: **Authors' Compilation**

3.1.2 Objective Two: To analyse the relationship between the policy objectives and policy outcomes of the creation of new districts.

The mixed approach was adopted for the achievement of this objective. The first quantitative aspect of the research involved regression analysis using secondary data from selected government agencies to identify the relationship between district creation and development. The second quantitative aspect involved the collection and analysis of surveys from citizens of nine selected districts on their perspective of development in their areas.

3.1.2.1 Conceptualisation of District Creation in Ghana as a Development Tool

The creation of districts and decentralisation have been argued to facilitate development through the provision of basic development needs such as education, healthcare, water and poverty reduction by devolving power, administration, finances and human resources to the sub-national government level. As far as economic development is concerned, Bird and Smart (2001) advocate that decentralisation brings governance closer to the citizen level, thus helping overcome the information deficiency, agency cost, and the problem of collective decision-making, which ultimately paves the way for efficient service provision (Bird and Smart, 2001).

The basic economic rationale for decentralisation rests largely on a negative observation; the inability of central government to deliver many public services efficiently. In a study on the pure theory of local expenditure, Tiebout (1956) argued that decentralisation should aid in the provision of public goods and services tailored to suit consumer preferences efficiently in heterogeneous societies, further highlighting that faster information exchange becomes fruitful for resource allocation, contributing to increased efficiency in public goods and service provision. This improves the process of decision-making on resource allocation and mobilisation. Thus, the most efficient allocation of public resources is attained if such services are provided (and paid for) by governments responsible to those most directly affected.

The United Nations Development Programme's Human Development Index (HDI) emphasises that people and their capabilities should be the ultimate criteria for assessing the development of a country, not economic growth alone. The HDI is a summary measure of average achievement in key dimensions of human development: education, health and income. On the basis of the HDI and availability of data at the sub national governmental level of Ghana, development within the context of the foregoing study was construed as an index of an education variable (Literacy Rate) and a health variable (Percentage of skilled delivery (deliveries attended by skilled health personnel)) to form a pro-poor development index (using Principal Component Analysis⁶ as a proxy for development). The absence of district level income data, across the observation points in Ghana, presented a limitation in the use of the HDI approach in the construction of the index

⁶ Principal Component Analysis (PCA) is the general name for a technique which uses sophisticated underlying mathematical principles to transform a number of possibly correlated variables into a smaller number of variables called principal components.

for development.

The literacy rate is the percentage of the population for a given age group that can read and write with understanding (UNESCO, 2008). The literacy rate shows accumulated achievement of primary education and literacy programmes. It represents a potential for further intellectual growth and contribution to the economic-socio-cultural development of districts. The impact of literacy on economic development is positive and can be easily determined by comparing the standard of living, per capita income, GDP, industrialisation and development of infrastructure within a country. Literacy enhances the working capabilities of people by providing them with skill development (Qurrallulain, 2006).

Percentage of skill delivery measures the number of birth attended by skilled personnel, per a period, by the total number of live births occurring with the same period. The main purpose of an indicator of the skilled attendant at delivery is to provide information on women's use of delivery care services. In addition, the proportion of births attended by skilled health personnel is a measure of the health system's functioning and potential to provide adequate coverage for deliveries. Many argue that increasing the proportion of deliveries with a skilled attendant is the single most critical intervention for reducing maternal mortality. Moreover, the proportion of births with a skilled attendant acts as a benchmark indicator for monitoring progress towards the Sustainable Development Goals (WHO, 2006).

According to Local Government Act 2016 (Act 936), the creation of districts in Ghana is based on the size of the population, the geographical contiguity and the economic viability to provide basic developmental needs. The population size is the primary factor considered in the creation of districts and decentralisation in Ghana, therefore it is an important variable to consider in studying the creation of districts. The effect of population on development is one of the debatable topics in the research. The negative impact is chiefly advocated by the theory of Malthus in his book "Essay on the Principle of Population". The Malthusian Population Trap is the main theory which supports the negative impact of population on economic growth and development. There are a few other theories which support the positive impact, stating the importance of human capital on economic development in a country. This also arises from the fact that any growth in economic development needs human capital as its main resource and a rise in population can act as a provider of human capital. According to this view, population growth is the real strength and power of a country.

With higher population, we will have a higher labour force and this will help create labour diversity in the nation, and, in turn, will increase output of a nation, all other factors being equal (Bhanu, 2016).

These categorisations do not reflect the resource endowment of a district before it is created. However, adequate financial resources are required to provide improved public service delivery and, by extension, development, post district creation. Implicitly, the resources for examining the development agenda of a district - construed within the context of this study, will be the Internally Generated Funds (IGF) from the district, all other factors being equal. However, Section 240 (2) (c) of the Local Government Act states that each local government unit shall have a sound financial base with adequate and reliable sources of revenue. Despite this requirement, many MMDAs have a limited number of revenue sources for carrying out their activities. Article 252 of the 1992 Constitution of Ghana further provides the District Assembly Common Fund (DACF) as another, relatively predictable income stream for the development of a district, which invariably is contingent on factors such as the economic profile of the district, availability of health services, education services, water coverage and tarred road coverage.

The level of governance at the district level is another factor worth considering in the development of a district. The Governance index is premised on the District Performance Management score using the Functional and Organizational Assessment Tool (FOAT) of the Ministry of Local Development and Rural Development (MLDRD). The justification for the governance indicator is that effective and efficient management of district resources is vital to their development (Hulter and Shah, 1998). According to Khan (2007), good governance is seen as a key element in economic development, particularly in the developing countries. Based on empirical analysis, the study argues that there is a substantial correlation between good governance and an increase of income per capita, seeing good governance as an important factor in economic growth and development. The FOAT Performance Management score involves the use of detailed indicators to measure performance and is classified under nine sub-themes as follows: *Management and Organisation; Transparency, Openness and Accountability; Planning System; Human Resource Management; Relationship with sub-district structures; Financial Management and Auditing; Fiscal Capacity; Procurement; and Environmental Sanitation Management.*

Thus, local government development can be seen to be driven by the summary of factors outlined

below, which provide a generic model for conducting an empirical assessment in line with studies such as Osei Kwadwo and Buadi Mensah (2016), studying the link between district creation and poverty reduction in Ghana.

District Development = Function of [Population, Revenue and Governance of District]

DD = f [Population, Revenue Availability and Governance of District]

District Development (DD) = (Literacy Rate and % of skilled birth delivery)

Revenue = (IGF and DACF)

Governance = (District Performance Score based on FOAT)

Population = Population Size

Table 4: Description of Variables

Variable	Definition
Pro-Poor Development Index	An aggregate of education and health variables to form a pro-poor index using the principal component analysis
Education	Literacy rate: estimates based on people aged 15 or over who can read and write. Sourced from the 2010 population census on the 216 districts.
Percentage of Skilled Delivery	Number of Skilled Deliveries / number of expected deliveries (based on population data). Sourced from the Ministry of Health's (Health Management Information database) on the 216 districts.
Population	Total number of people residing in the districts under study. Drawn from Ghana Statistical Service.
Total Internally Generated Funds (IGF)	The proportion (actual value) of total revenue which is internally generated from local taxes, rent fees and fines, and investment by the 216 districts in 2013. Drawn from the Ghana Audit Service Report (2013) on 216 districts.

Status of District	A categorisation under the three levels of sub-national divisions: Districts, Municipal, and Metropolitan areas
DACF	District Assembly Common Fund 2013.Sourced from the DACF database
Governance Index	Performance Measure Score aggregate (2013 Functional and Organizational Assessment Tool FOAT). Sourced from United Nations Children Fund Center for Democratic Development (CDD) District League Table (UNICEF- CDD DLT)

Source: Authors' Compilation, 2017

3.1.2.2 Estimation Method

The estimation is a simple log-linear model Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression. The reason for the log-linear model is to handle the non-linear relationship that exists between the independent and dependent variables (Kenneth, 2011). The generalised model is represented mathematically in equation 1 below:

$$Y_e = \alpha + \beta_1 \ln X_{1i} + \beta_2 \ln X_{2i} + \beta_3 \ln X_{3i} + \beta_4 \ln X_{4i} + \varepsilon_i \quad (1)$$

From equation 1, the dummy regressor/variable representing the explanatory variable for districts created after 2004 is introduced. This will explain the effect of district creation on development while controlling for population, DACF, the Governance index and IGF. Therefore, the generalised model is redefined to equation 2 below:

$$Y_e = \alpha + \beta_1 \ln X_{1i} + \beta_2 \ln X_{2i} + \beta_3 \ln X_{3i} + \beta_4 \ln X_{4i} + \theta_{dt} D_{dt} + \varepsilon_i \quad (2)$$

Where

Y_e = pro-poor development index computed via the PCA

X_{1i} = Population

X_{2i} = IGF

X_{3i} = DACF

X_{4i} =Governance Index

D_{dt} =Dummy for districts after 2004

ε_i =Error term

\ln =Natural log

β_1 - β_4 = coefficient of the independent variables

α = Intercept

θ = coefficient of the dummy variable

The expected coefficients of β_2 , β_3 and β_4 are positive. This indicates that for every unit increase in IGF, DACF and Governance Index, development should increase by an absolute value of coefficients, for the districts. For β_1 , which is the coefficient for population, the expected coefficient is either negative or positive. The Malthusian Population Trap is the main theory which supports the negative impact of population on economic growth and development. While the positive impact is explained by the fact that any growth in economic development needs human capital as its main resource and the rise in population can act as a provider of human capital. For θ which the coefficient of district creation, the expected coefficient is positive.

The significance of the coefficients of the independent variables was tested at the 95% confidence interval. The null hypothesis states that the coefficients of the independent variables are equal to zero and the alternate hypothesis is that the coefficients of the independent variables are not equal to zero. A t-test statistic was used to test the hypothesis that each coefficient is different from 0 or statistically significant. This test provided a p-value, which represents the probability that random chance could explain the result; in general, a variable with p-value of 5% or lower is considered to be statistically significant. Meaning that, to reject the null hypothesis, the p-value has to be lower than 0.05. This means the p-value of the coefficient should be lower than 0.05 to be statistically significant.

The other aspect of the quantitative research involved conducting surveys to understand citizen's perspectives on the subject matter as well as collecting data on the representation of the corresponding ten constituencies. The ten districts in Ghana were selected as case studies/points of reference. The selection was undertaken through the division of the country into three zones;

Northern, Middle and Southern belts. Out of these three belts, at least three districts and constituencies were selected in each belt to ensure fair representation. For the districts, researchers were interested in their diverse statuses. Therefore, the team tried to inculcate a mixture of districts, municipalities and metropolitan assemblies. The year in which the districts were created was also taken into consideration. For the constituencies, voting patterns were considered to investigate whether the creation of constituencies favoured the ruling political party.

Two hundred citizens were randomly selected in each of the ten districts and asked their opinions on the progress of certain development indicators (Education, Health, Security) in their areas. These indicators were chosen as some existing literature has shown that decentralisation may have the tendency to improve public service delivery as well as bring development closer to the doorsteps of people. The responses were given on a Likert scale to analyse them in an objective, comparable manner. The results of the survey were then compared to data on development indicators that were provided by government agencies, such as the District Assemblies, Municipal Assemblies, the District Education Directorate and Health Directorates. These district case studies were conducted to observe the relationship between official reports of the status of development over time and the perception of those who actually observed the gradual development. Observations from government agencies were collected from 2004-2016. Questions in the surveys for the respondents in the districts were asked in relation to their perceptions of development from 2004 to the present time. Observations from both groups were asked on the following sectors: education, health, emergency services, security and internally generated funds.

3.1.3 Objective Three: To analyse the degree to which MPs' representation in parliament of the new constituencies created out of new districts in 2004 aligned with their mandate by assessing whether MPs successfully lobbied the National Government through Ministerial question time; Public Statements on the floor of Parliament; the Government Assurances Committee and other Parliamentary tools, to ensure representation and to plug development shortfalls in their districts.

In order to achieve objective three of the study, a qualitative content analysis was conducted by studying the contributions by twelve MPs. These MPs represented ten randomly selected

constituencies newly created in 2004. The study analysed the contributions over a period of eight years (2005-2012). Digital copies of Parliamentary Hansards, Order Papers and Votes and Proceedings over the period were gathered or collected. An internally developed algorithm, developed by Odekro, was used to extract relevant data for analytical purposes. Extracted data (MPs' contributions), comprising a total of 5,408 statements, were organised and clustered into the three key functions of MPs – oversight of the executive, legislation and representation. The reason for doing this was for comparative purposes; to assess the extent to which MPs from newly created constituencies were representing the development interests of their constituents in fulfilment of the representational mandate relative to other mandates. The extracted data was further delineated to gather contributions of MPs from newly created constituencies regarding law making, constituency related matters, oversight issues, occasional discussions and debates on the floor of Parliament; to establish the frequency of contributions by individual MPs and to relate the frequency and cluster of contributions (oversight and legislative) to MPs' mandate of representation.

3.2 Data Sources

Data was obtained from both primary and secondary sources using varied techniques. Primary source of data was gathered through interviews, observations and questionnaires. The secondary sources of data were from various publications, reports, documents, records, annual financial statements and annual budgets. The data source points included the Metropolitan, Municipal and District Assemblies (MMDAs), Ghana Statistical Service (GSS), District Assembly Common Fund (DACF), Auditor General's Department, Ministry of Health, Ministry of Education, Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development.

3.3 Data Analysis

The study adopted two main methods of data analysis; a qualitative and a quantitative one. For objective two, the data collected were analysed using Stata 13 and Microsoft Excel. Since the objective was quantitative in nature, the findings were presented in simple descriptive statistics involving some tables and charts. The other leg of the section which sought to solicit the views of the citizens, views and responses were descriptively analysed and presented in simple charts and diagrams to easy comparison and analyses.

3.4 Limitations And Challenges

The study faced numerous challenges, the main challenge being the lack of available data on various development indicators, such as the literacy rate, and skilled delivery on yearly basis. Despite contacting the relevant institutions in each district across the country, seeking regional and national approval for the release of data, there was some reluctance to make data available. Furthermore, some districts that did make their data available for the purpose of this study, had inconsistent records, with gaps in data of some indicators. There was a lack of cooperation from the Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development, and other state agencies, throughout the project.

4.0 ANALYSIS

4.1 Objective One: To analyse the policy used by the Electoral Commission of Ghana in the creation of parliamentary constituencies (which is currently tied to new administrative districts created by the executive) and the possibility of abuse of the system to favour a political party

The creation of constituencies and the demarcation of electoral boundaries in Ghana commenced from 1950 up to 1982. The exercise, during that period, was undertaken by a Delimitation Commission using a formula that is akin to the current population quota formula. The 1957 Constitution clearly pegged the maximum number of parliamentarians the country should have at a given point in time to 130 members and a minimum of 104 members (Asare, 2012).

“The National Assembly shall consist of a Speaker and not less than 104 members to be known as Members of Parliament (MP); but the number of MPs may be increased from time to time by the creation of further electoral districts under the provisions of sections 33, 70 and 71, but in any event the total number of MPs shall not exceed 130.”(Article 20(2) of the 1957 Constitution of the Republic of Ghana).

Successive constitutions (1992 Constitution inclusive), with the exception of that of 1969, have made no provision to cap the number of constituencies and Parliamentarians the country should have. This is a situation that has created room for manipulation and frequent alterations to Ghana’s electoral boundaries and proliferation of constituencies.

Article 43 of the 1992 constitution legally establishes the Electoral Commission and mandates it to review and create constituencies and conduct elections in the country. Specifically, Article 45 of the Constitution commands the Commission:

- (a) to compile the register of voters and revise it at such periods as may be determined by law; (b) to demarcate the electoral boundaries for both national and local government elections;*
- (c) to conduct and supervise all public elections and referenda;*

- (d) To educate the people on the electoral process and its purpose;*
- (e) To undertake programmes for the expansion of the registration of voters; and*
- (f) To perform such other functions as may be prescribed by law.*

Furthermore, in their pursuit to demarcate electoral boundaries for both national and local government elections, some caveats have been provided:

- 1. No constituency should fall within more than one region;*
- 2. No constituency should cut across a district boundary;*
- 3. No electoral area should cut across a constituency boundary;*
- 4. No unit area should cut across an electoral area boundary.*

Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development (2012)

The Constitution of Ghana gives the mandate of the creation and review of parliamentary constituencies to the Electoral Commission (EC). It is stated in article 47 of the 1992 Constitution that:

- (3) The boundaries of each constituency shall be such that the number of inhabitants in the constituency is, as nearly as possible, equal to the population quota.*
- (4) For the purposes of clause (3) of this article, the number of inhabitants of a constituency may be greater or less than the population quota in order to take account of means of communication, geographical features, density of population and area and boundaries of the regions and other administrative or traditional areas.*
- (5) The Electoral Commission shall review the division of Ghana into constituencies at intervals of not less than seven years, or within twelve months after the publication of the enumeration figures after the holding of a census of the population of Ghana, whichever is earlier, and may, as a result, alter the constituencies.*
- (7) For the purposes of this article, "population quota" means the number obtained by dividing the number of inhabitants of Ghana by the number of constituencies 'into which Ghana is divided under this article.*

The Constitution makes an emphasis on the use of the population quota as a means to demarcate constituencies and ensure that approximately the same number of people are represented in Parliament in each constituency by each Member of Parliament (MP). However, despite this stipulation, the Electoral Commission have their own, slightly different method of calculating the size of constituencies. The current formula for the creation of constituencies involves making a weighted decision based 90% on the population of an area and 10% on the land size of the area (**see Box 4 Statement 5.3**), as stated by representatives of the EC during an interview. It was also stated that some consideration is given to other factors, such as the presence of various tribes in an electoral area.

A possible explanation for this deviation from the population quota was given during an interview with a constitutional law expert. It was suggested that the EC tends to rather follow PNDC Law 284 (5) as an excuse covering the fact that constituencies are created because the Executive has created districts (**see Box 6 Statement 8.1**). PNDC Law 284 (5) states the same condition as the aforementioned article 47 (4) of the Constitution.

This view, that the constituencies are created due to the creation of districts, and not for the sole purpose of more effective representation of citizens in Parliament, is not uncommon. Veritably, representatives from the Electoral Commission stated that the creation of new districts is a factor that encourages the creation of new constituencies (**see Box 4 Statement 5.5**). The reason behind this is that since MPs are ex-officio members of districts, and an individual is legally ban from belonging to more than one district, it is logically inferred that a representative of a constituency in parliament cannot also be a part of two districts. This was reiterated during an interview with a Local Governance expert (**see Box 2 Statement 2.3**). Considering the effect and complexities of MPs membership of the various district assemblies on the demarcation process, the question that emanates is, is it still relevant to allow MPs to maintain their membership at the assemblies?

Though this provision has afforded MPs the opportunity to be well informed of the prevailing issues in the constituencies, in order to play their advocacy roles more effectively, certain emerging issues need to be carefully addressed. The role of MPs as legislators has been confused with being agents of local development probably for two reasons; first, their membership with the assembly and their allocation of the Common Fund, and secondly, the level of accountability demanded from the electorates. As a result, constituents place demand and pressure on MPs instead of the DCEs

for developmental concerns (Ahwoi, 2010). This has created an unnecessary rivalry and tension between MPs and DCEs, delaying the execution and use of developmental projects in some areas. (see **Box 3 Statement 4.1**, Ahwoi, (2010)).

However, the established link between the creation of districts by the Executive and the creation of constituencies by the EC, has informed people's perspectives to assert that districts are created by ruling political parties in areas where they have a stronghold, in order to garner more seats in parliament, and amass greater power. This is supported by representatives of the Convention People's Party (CPP) and National Democratic Congress (NDC), as well as a local governance expert (see **Box 1 Statement 1.2; Box 2 Statement 2.2; and Box 5 Statement 6.4**). However, this is contrary to the view of the New Patriotic Party (NPP) (see **Box 6 Statement 7.5**), as well as one of the mandates of the EC, as specified in Article 46 of the Constitution, which states:

Except as provided in this Constitution or in any other law not inconsistent with this Constitution, in the performance of its functions, the Electoral Commission, shall not be subject to the direction or control of any person or authority

Although Article 47 (5) of the 1992 Constitution only allows for the review of the boundaries of constituencies after no less than seven years or within twelve months of a population census, previous demarcation exercises have not followed this. Population censuses take place every ten years, with the last one taking place in 2010. After the publication of the 2000 population census in 2001, the then Minister of Finance, stated that the timing of the publication would enable the government to more efficiently plan for the following year's national budget: *"This is because it allows enough time for the Electoral Commission to fulfil a constitutional mandate to use the census results 12 months from now to review constituency boundaries for effective democratic principle of equitable distribution of national resources"* (Ghanaweb, 2001). However, the EC decided to wait an additional three years before reviewing and creating new constituencies in 2004. This, and another constituency creation exercise in 2008, also coincidentally occurred within the same years some districts were created, which further seems to support the aforementioned assertions made by the constitutional law expert and the EC that there is a link between district and constituency creation.

Furthermore, the Constitution only calls for a review of the boundaries of constituencies and does not necessarily stipulate that EC should create more. This point is highlighted by the EC (see **Box**

4 Statement 5.4), who stated that the Electoral Reform Committee recommended that it should be possible for the review process to reduce the number of constituencies, yet current reviewing processes have only resulted in the creation of additional ones.

The inconsistency of the EC in following their mandate for the creation of constituencies breeds even more speculation that there could be an abuse of the system or power, i.e. that gerrymandering occurs.

Additionally, some national and international consultants have recommended that there is no need for the creation of additional districts and constituencies (see **Box 5 Statement 6.3 and Box 5 Statement 7.1**). If the advice of these consultants had been followed, and no new districts were created after 2003, one wonders whether there would have been a need for the creation of constituencies.

Box 1: Selection of interview with Conventional People's Party (CPP)

Statement 1.1: *"...the districts are too much because we keep creating them yet no development. The need for its creation is to bring about development but then they are created and left hanging four to five years without anything been done. All this are due to non-quantifiable promises given by government"*

Statement 1.2: The creation of districts does not ensure an increase in the development of an area, leading to the conclusion that the creation must be linked to the creation of constituencies in order to garner political votes.

Statement 1.3: There is a perception that representation brings more development to an area. However, this is a false perception, as development in areas is based on districts rather than constituencies. In order to stop this false perception, the public should be allowed to elect the District Chief Executives (DCEs) of their areas in the same way that they elect their Members of Parliament (MPs).

Statement 1.4: *"...we've not been educated enough to understand that parliamentarians don't construct roads, toilets, bathrooms and so on. **They are there to enact laws...**"*

Statement 1.5: *"**District chief executives are meant to be elected** not appointed, to keep them on their toes to work so if they don't the citizens and community members get to decide their fate through elections"*

Statement 1.6: *"...if you create a district you must create a constituency. But with some districts the population is so huge that some people are left out in the decision making. That is why there is political tension in the country even though we are peace loving people."*

Box 2: Selection of interview with: Local Governance Expert

Statement 2.1: *"The creation of districts is provided for in law but it has been but this is always **premised by population census**. You can only activate the provision of the law if the population census has been carried out. As soon as the population census is carried out, the electoral commission will tell you that, the population in a particular area, far exceeds their district status so there is the need for the flow over to lead to the creation of districts or municipals or metros. That is one aspect. The other aspect is where the people themselves think that there have been a number of indicators which, to them, suggests that the number of people will have to be split, they can make an appeal to the president, the president will then have to run it by the electoral commission, the electoral commission will then test the validity of the claim being made by the people and advice the president for the district to be created. Whichever way we look at it, the most important one which is **provided by the law is the one the electoral commission advices, the president takes action.**"*

Statement 2.2: *"...if the districts are created, definitely, it will lead to the **creation of constituencies**, and once parliamentary seats are based of constituencies, parliamentarians are very careful in creating it. So, they look at their strongholds and that is where the law is silent on. The law should have made a provision that, where it affects the strongholds of the ruling party, this is the process to go. Because the law is silent on it, most of the political parties when they are in power, they cause a population census to be conducted, the results are released and they tell you that 'look the results indicate that we have to create more districts', knowing very well that as soon as they are created, constituencies will be created. **Once constituencies are created in their strongholds, they are very sure they will win more seats in parliament**"*

Statement 2.3: Sometimes, when new districts are created, they are formed between existing constituencies. Since it is seen as unfavourable for one constituency to contain the citizens of two districts, a new constituency is also created. In cases where there are two districts within one constituency, governance issues arise, such as the method of sharing the Common Fund for the districts and constituencies

Statement 2.4: Since feasibility analyses are not properly carried out prior to the creation of districts, some did not and **do not have the resources to be able to economically support themselves**, or to even equip the district assembly offices.

Source: Authors' Compilation

Source: Authors' Compilation

Box 3: Selection of interview with:

Institute for Democracy and Economic Governance (IDEG)

Statement 3.1: The core reasons why **districts are created are supposed to be for development and for democracy**. However, neither of these goals are commonly achieved with the creation of districts. **Demarcation usually leads to less development in the newly created districts**. People in the newly created districts usually have high expectations for development, which are seldom met there are less funds than before.

Statement 3.2: Increased democracy has not happened as a result of demarcation either. This is evidenced by the finances in districts. **Most districts don't generate their own funds, but rather wait for the DACF before doing anything**. Most districts in Ghana have consistently proven that their inability to generate enough Internally Generated Funds (IGF) to totally support themselves.

Statement 3.3: There is a connection between regions and cultural groups, with regions being culturally distinct. Because of this, it won't be viable to have a plan to graduate from districts to municipalities to metropolitans to regions, etc.

Legal Expert 1

Statement 4.1: *"In the current dispensation, constituents place many of the demands they should place on the DCE on the MP because the DCE is not sufficiently empowered to provide for local development. The MP is also not sufficiently empowered (through funds etc.) to execute local development."*

Box 4: Selection of Interview with: Electoral Commission (EC)

Statement 5.1: *"The population quota is a threshold that is set knowing that our landmass is constant. If your landmass is constant and the population is growing, you need to evaluate and review your population quota anytime there is census...The quota is changed so as to ensure fair representation."*

Statement 5.2: The Constitution is not emphatic on the creation of constituencies, but rather states that the EC should review and alter existing ones.

Statement 5.3: [On the creation of constituencies] *"From what we do as a Commission, looking at the population quota, **we give a weight of 0.9 to population and 0.1 to a landmass**. But there are other factors like continuity, the ability of the various communities to live together and the alignment of the electoral areas. You can't just pick one tribe and mix it another without proper consideration, the kind of demarcation is also important."*

Statement 5.4: *"After the Election Petition, The Electoral Reform Committee was formed to look at some of these developments and in their deliberations, they **recommended that it should be possible for the review process to target reduction**. Their recommendation was that we should **maintain 250 constituencies** for a period of time."*

Statement 5.5: *"At times the **Commission's hands are twisted by the government** when the government creates new districts. Once a new district is created out of an existing one, there is a rule that no constituency should cross two districts hence the Commission is forced to create a new constituency."*

Statement 5.6: The EC's role in the creation of districts is purely advisory and the recommendations given to The Executive are not binding. However, with the creation of constituencies, the Electoral Commission plays a more powerful role

Statement 5.7: Ghana could maintain 200 seats in total in parliament. However, no government in power were likely to do so as they are in fear of incurring the wrath of a vast number of citizens who are of the belief that the smaller the number of people an MP represents, the greater the focus on development will be.

Statement 5.8: There are lot of challenges in the creation of new constituencies. These include political influence, education, and field data collection from locals to understand the area better. The naming of constituencies can sometimes lead to legal issues. Another issue is a lack of updated maps, making the EC's work extremely difficult. Population migration is also an issue that needs to be considered during the review process.

Source: Authors' Compilation

Box 5: Selection of interview with: National Democratic Congress (NDC)

Statement 6.1: As a culture, **we are too small to create so many constituencies.**

Statement 6.2: Although the law allows new constituencies to be created immediately after a census, the reasoning behind the creation of new constituencies is borne from a need to increase political advantage. **The creations didn't bring about much of a development advantage**, but that they rather put additional pressure on the public budget. The creations were either not necessary or too many constituencies were created at the same time.

Statement 6.3: There was a consultative meeting with the National Development Planning Commission (NDPC) in 2003. In the meeting, the NDPC found that there was no evidence of a need to create more districts, as there would be an increase in development challenges and subjectivity. More focus should be on strengthening the decentralisation process rather than continuous demarcation exercises.

Statement 6.4: Although technical reasons, such as censuses, are given for the creation of constituencies, the political reasons behind demarcation can be questionable. There have been experiences of conversations in the past, where there was **talk of being able to easily win constituencies if borders were changed.**

Statement 6.5: **MPs shouldn't not be agents of development as this is not the job of an MP.** The role of an MP has been muddled due to them having a share of the Common Fund. However, the MP's share of the common fund was a compromise on another action rather than a push for MPs to be seen as agents of development. **The overlap of roles between MPs and the DCEs creates conflict and complications.** Districts should be left to manage the resources for their own district and development.

Statement 6.6: The EC has taken on too many responsibilities; too much discretionary authority migrates to the executives of the Electoral Commission.

Source: Authors' Compilation

Box 6: Selection of interview with:

New Patriotic Party (NPP)

Statement 7.1: In 2004, an independent consultant with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), advised the government that Ghana should have 250 constituencies. This helps to understand the reasoning behind the current 275 constituencies.

Statement 7.2: Another consultant recommended that there should be one MP for every 45,000 people. However, this would have created distortions. For example, Greater Accra would have had 67 seats in parliament.

Statement 7.3: The idea of capping the number of constituencies is an American idea. Ghana, as a newer democracy, should have its own method.

Statement 7.4: The Executive and the EC are sometimes in competition as to who can create constituencies

Statement 7.5: Since the EC is very independent and autonomous from the government as they derive their powers from the constitution and have their own budget, there is no need for another independent body to take the power of creating constituencies.

Statement 7.6: Creating smaller districts does indeed add to development, but also increases the costs of managing districts

Constitutional Law Expert

Statement 8.1: The EC tends to rather follow PNDC Law 284. Since this law allows for an unequal number of inhabitants, the EC utilises this as an excuse for the creation of constituencies, but the true reason for the creation of these constituencies is the fact that the Executive has created new districts.

Source: Authors' Compilation

4.1.1 Recommendations from Interviewees

Box 7.1: List of Recommendations from interviewees part 1

Recommendations		
<p>CPP:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Recommendation 1.1: More public education is needed to understand the link between development and representation. • Recommendation 1.2: District Chief Executives should be elected 	<p>Local Governance Expert</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Recommendation 2.1: There should be feasibility and value for money studies conducted in areas prior to the creation of new districts. There should also be impact assessment undertaken after the creation to observe the performance of new districts. • Recommendation 2.2: “1. I think we should have a <i>national cap</i> on it [the number of constituencies], and 2. we should <i>always peg the creation of constituencies to percentages of the national population.</i> And you should also <i>look at the habitation</i>, not the area. Because you can create constituencies, especially when you go to the northern part of Ghana, you create bigger constituencies but the human beings living there are only 5,000. You can compare that one with the constituency in Accra which has about 50, 40 thousand people.” • Recommendation 2.3: “We should also develop a progressive system where these things [constituencies] can progress to become regions.” • Recommendation 2.4: The law should be amended to ensure that if a population census is carried out, the ruling government shouldn’t be able to automatically create new constituencies 	<p>IDEG</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Recommendation 3.1: Districts can be merged or there can be a freeze on the creation of them.

Source: Authors’ Compilation

Box 7.2: List of Recommendations from interviewees part 2

Recommendations	
<p>Legal Expert</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Recommendation 4.1: <i>“I propose that the function of constituency creation should be taken away from the EC. The EC’s sole task should be to run elections because when it injects itself into the constituency creation process, it automatically opens itself up to be compromised by the politics of the day.”</i> • Recommendation 4.2: <i>“The formula for determining new districts should be re-thought.”</i> • Recommendation 4.3: <i>“In addition to population size, land size (for economic viability) should be considered. In that situation two districts should be able to decide to collapse into one if the people decide that their separate districts are not as economically viable as they should be.”</i> • Recommendation 4.4: <i>“I recommend that you freeze the specific land space area of each constituency instead of creating new constituencies. Freeze the numbers of constituencies also.”</i> • Recommendation 4.5: <i>“There should be no more than 150 MPs in two houses; an upper appointed chamber and a lower elected chamber. The members (MPs) of the lower chamber would be appointed from amongst 10 district representatives per region or by this group of elected representatives. This selection process will ensure local accountability through the election of those currently occupying the DCE role, but also ensure competence is injected into the process through the selection of the MP by peer (old) DCE’s.”</i> • Recommendation 4.6: <i>“The constitution is written with the conception that DCE’s are simply an extension of the President’s authority in the district. Instead the DCE position should be designed to wield real administrative and political power.”</i> 	<p>EC</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Recommendation 5.1: <i>“One thing that can help us is to re-demarcate and redistribution of the constituencies taking into consideration the population growth and the accepted number of constituencies. We also need a legislation that will cap the total number of constituencies the country can accommodate at a period.”</i>

Source: Authors’ Compilation Based on Opinions of Interviewees Contacted for the Study

Box 7.3: List of Recommendations from interviewees part 3

Recommendations		
NDC	NPP	Constitutional Law Expert
<ul style="list-style-type: none">•Recommendation 6.1: There should be a cap on the number of constituencies that there is now and we should maintain them to optimise the use of public resources. The freeze on demarcation should last at least two decades/four elections. The current number of MPs/constituencies to people doesn't lead to efficiency but rather more bureaucracy and we can't solve an efficiency problem by creating more bureaucracy.•Recommendation 6.2: Demarcation has to be linked to the larger development picture and so should be shifted to the institution that observes planning issues.•Recommendation 6.3: There is nothing can be done if the President decides to create Districts, as it is within the executive's authority. This power may also need to be changed.	<ul style="list-style-type: none">•Recommendation 7.1: The current number of constituencies [275] should be maintained	<ul style="list-style-type: none">•Recommendation 8.1: Adopt a method of redemarcation practised in other countries, such as Kenya and the United States of America

Source: Authors Compilation (2017)

Numerous experts interviewed for this study came to the conclusion that the number of constituencies should be capped (See **Box 7.1 Recommendations 2.2 and 3.1, Box 7.2 Recommendations 4.5 and 5.1, and Box 7.3 Recommendation 6.1 and 7.1**). Although the number at which constituencies and districts should be capped varies, 6 out of 8 (75 percent) of interviewees advised that capping should take place in Ghana.

Another common recommendation is that there needs to be more public education to stop the perception that there is a link between representation in parliament by MPs and development achieved by districts (See **Box 7.1.Recommendation 1.1**). This view was reiterated during discussions with interviewees (See **Box 3 Statement 3.1**).

It was also suggested that the power to create constituencies be taken away from the Electoral Commission and given to an agency or commission that doesn't also manage the elections in the country (See **Box 7.2 Recommendation 4.1**). Additionally, there is a call for more clarity in the formula for district creation and feasibility and value for money analyses to be carried out before

the creation of districts (**See Box 7.2, Recommendation 4.1 and Box 7.1 Recommendation 2.1**).

A Constitutional Law expert suggested that Ghana adopt a method of redemarcation practised in other countries, such as Kenya and the United States of America. In the United States, the case of *Reynolds vs. Sims* (1963) was brought to the Supreme Court. It was argued that the apportionment of state legislature in counties in Alabama was not proportional, as the Constitution of Alabama at the time stated that there should be as many senators as senatorial districts (akin to constituencies in Ghana) and that each county was entitled to one representative. However, due to population variances, representation was skewed. Based on the results of this case, the law in the US was amended to uphold the ruling that each district should have as close to the same population as each other as possible. In that case, instead of creating new districts to represent growing populations, the US simply redistributes the boundaries of the existing districts so that an equal number of citizens is represented in them. This means that in the Lower House, the number of representatives has remained constant. This system also accommodates for differences in populations relating to changing migration patterns. In Kenya, stipulations on electoral boundaries are similar to those in Ghana and the US in Kenya's 2010 Constitution. However, as the constitution does not call for a review of the boundaries for no less than eight years, it remains to be seen whether equal representation will be maintained.

4.2 Objective Two: To analyse the relationship between the policy objectives of the creation of new districts and the policy outcomes.

The data covers the 216 sub-national local government division in Ghana. Table 5 below provides a summary of statistics of the dependent variable and independent variables. Data on pro-poor development index and the literacy rate was short of 42 observations. The IGF variable was also short of 28 observations.

Table 5: Descriptive Statistics

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Development	174	-1.67e-08	1.023786	-2.823212	1.642692
Population	216	11.41938	.5596094	9.917489	14.36378
IGF	188	12.40636	1.113886	8.162531	17.04124
DACF	216	13.92954	.146652	13.75804	14.80486
Governance	216	4.538471	.0631296	4.043051	4.60517
Dummy for District After 2004	216	.5138889	.5009681	0	1
% of Skilled Delivery	216	3.877759	.4952611	2.302585	4.60517
Literacy Rate	174	4.169986	.3346695	3.010621	4.531524

Source: Author, 2017

Table 6 presents the Pearson correlation patterns, showing the interaction between the dependent variable and the independent variables. Population, IGF, DACF, and Governance, are positively correlated with the pro-poor development index. In the model, IGF has the strongest linear association with development. The dummy for districts created after 2004, shows a negative correlation with development.

Table 6: Pearson's Correlation of Variables

	Dev	Pop	IGF	DACF	Gov	Dummy 2004	LitRt	SkllDel
Development	1.0000							
Population	0.2623	1.0000						
IGF	0.4545	0.6315	1.0000					
DACF	0.1001	0.6107	0.3910	1.0000				
Governance	0.1361	0.0861	0.1913	0.0531	1.0000			
Dummy 2004	-0.2177	-0.3076	-0.1711	-0.0639	-0.0575	1.0000		
Literacy Rate	0.7181	0.2258	0.4450	0.0325	0.0842	-0.0166	1.0000	
% of Skilled								
Delivery	0.7136	0.1496	0.2049	0.1111	0.1108	-0.2960	0.0249	1.0000

Source: Author, 2017

The OLS estimation, using a robust standard error, is shown in table 7 below. The coefficient of determination of the regression, measured by the R-squared, is 23.6 percent. It is a measure of the overall fit of the model. This statistic indicates the 23.6 percent of the variation in development is explained collectively by independent variables in the model.

The decision rule for the testing of the significance was stated in the Methodology section, specifically that if a variable's absolute p-value < 0.05 , it is statistically significant. This would mean that the null hypothesis is rejected, which would signify the variable is statistically significant. On the other hand, if the absolute p-value > 0.05 , we do not reject the null hypothesis, which means the variable is statistically insignificant in the model. A closer look at the p-values

shows that the significant variables in the model are the IGF and the Dummy variable measuring the creation of the districts after 2004. The results determine that IGF has a positive impact on development whilst creation of district has a negative impact. According to the model, districts created after 2004 reduce the development index of Ghana by 0.00321unit.

In the case of IGF, an increase of one percent, leads to a 0.044 increase in the development index. But interestingly, the DACF has a negative impact on development, contradicting the expected positive impact and is not statistically significant as the p-value of 0.439 is greater than 0.05.

The population size, which is mostly used as the basis for districts, aside from the other factors, has a negative impact on the development index, which supports the argument of the negative impact of population on development, as argued by the Malthusian Theory of Population, but was not statistically significant in the model. The governance index had a positive impact on development but was not statistically significant.

Table 7: OLS Regression Results

Linear regression				Number of obs =		152	
				F(5, 146) =		7.26	
				Prob > F		= 0.0000	
				R-squared		= 0.2366	
				Root MSE		= .9033	
		Robust					
Development Index		Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]	
Population		-.087903	.2561729	-0.34	0.732	-.5941891	.4183832
IGF		.4463697	.1390972	3.21	0.002	.1714656	.7212739
DACF		-.4687981	.6038336	-0.78	0.439	-1.662182	.7245858
Governance		.0099087	.0193233	0.51	0.609	-.0282809	.0480983
CreationDummyafter2004		-.3123622	.1553488	-2.01	0.046	-.6193852	-.0053392
_cons		1.17062	7.288474	0.16	0.873	-13.23392	15.57516

Source: Author, 2017

4.2.1 Discussion of Results

Smoke (2001), studying the origins, conceptual foundations and practice of fiscal decentralisation in developing countries, stated that one of the reasons why developing countries shift their power from the central government to the local government is the fact that central government has failed

to promote adequate development. This argument is supported by one of six objectives for decentralisation, as outlined by Rondinelli et al. (1983), which states that an aim of decentralisation is to increase government responsiveness to meet the demands and needs of society. Therefore, decentralisation in Ghana is expected to promote socio-economic development at the sub-national level, which has emerged as the most pressing needs of local people. This function of promoting socio-economic development requires financial resources (Akudugu, 2012). IGF had a positive impact of 0.446 and is statistically significant in the model, which signifies the important role that local revenue generation plays in local development and provision of improved service delivery. The MMDAs that are not able to generate sufficient revenue at the local level for development are likely to depend heavily on the District Assemblies Common Fund (DACF) received from the central government to support their developmental programmes and public service delivery. The low level of revenue mobilisation, coupled with the usual delays in the releases of DACF, has had an impact on the development of MMDAs in Ghana. Also, there is a question about the extent to which the utilisation of IGFs and DACF are for pro-poor development. Given the impact of the IGF in the model, implicitly, districts with high IGFs are likely to have greater level of development than district with low IGFs all thing being equal.

Most countries have, at one time, pursued the process of decentralisation of powers to local governments seeking political and regional stabilisation and changes in governance through power sharing. Improved service delivery has been cited as an argument for continuing and deepening this reform. Many of the anticipated benefits of decentralisation are based on the premise that this policy would bring local decision makers closer to their constituents and their needs. With this, as well as the reasoning of the fiscal federalism literature, local decision-makers would be able to better tailor services and public spending patterns to local needs improving access, efficiency, and quality of services (Saavedra, 2010).

The creation of districts in the model had a negative impact on development. Despite the theoretical literature on this topic, which, overall, shows positive effects of decentralisation on development, the results agree with the work of many studies such as Lin and Liu (2000) and Zhang and Zou (1997), which do not support the argument of a positive relationship between decentralisation and development in developing countries. This brings up questions about the factors considered for the creation of districts, which, according to the Local Government Act 2016 (Act 936), is based on

the size of the population, the geographical contiguity and the economic viability to provide basic developmental needs. Central to these arguments are the essence of financial resources, and how they are managed.

The governance index in the model had a positive correlation and positive effect on development though not significant. These results strengthen the case argued about the importance of good governance on development such as the study by Ukwandu and Jarbandhan (2016) exploring the relationship between good governance and development in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), which showed a positive correlation between governance and development hence the need for it and its application.

4.2.2 Respondents' Perspective on Whether District Creation Has Spurred Development

There is a general perception that decentralisation is meant to improve public service delivery as well as bring development closer to the doorsteps of people. In Ghana, the story is no different, as the creation of new districts, in the minds of many, connotes bringing social services closer to people, enhancing development as well as deepening grassroots participation. Therefore, it is not surprising to see or hear traditional leaders “begging” politicians during campaign seasons to create new districts in their jurisdictions in case they win political power (Welsing, (2017); Ghanaian Times, (2017)). Some enthusiasts of this idea have further argued that bringing governance closer to the people has the potential to improve responsiveness and accountability, decrease corruption, and reduce both red-tape and government expenditure (Anila & Fauguet 2012). Logically this assertion may not be out of place given that decentralised units have the advantage of smaller, more homogeneous sizes compared to the national government. With greater opportunity to benefit from enhanced participation and a clearer picture of what the people need, decentralisation or creating smaller units should spur development and improve public service delivery. However, several empirical studies (Rondinelli et al, (1984), Shah et al, (2004), Treisman, (2007)) have discovered evidence to support a weak, contradictory and mixed effect of decentralisation on service delivery.


Shah et al. (2004), while reviewing 56 published studies from the 1990s concluded that decentralisation, in some instances, enhanced, and in other cases, worsened service delivery,

corruption and growth. The general lack of consensus about the empirical impact of decentralisation or the creation of new decentralised units on service delivery and general development necessitated the need to add residents' perspective to the analysis. The aim was to find out from the local people, whether the creation of districts had any positive effects in their lives. The impact was measured along some broad themes and has been elaborated in the subsequent section.

4.2.3 Demographic of respondents

4.2.3.1 Age

Figure 4: Age Demographics of respondents



Source: Authors' Compilation


Age is an important demographic indicator that tends to influence the responses received. From the pie chart above, respondents of the study cut across a wide range of age groups. However, out of the total number, a greater percentage (57 percent) were within the youth bracket (18-34). Specifically, 19 percent were between the ages of 18-24, while those within the ages of 25-24 constituted 38 percent. Also, Figure 4 reveals that the older population, those within the ages of 54-85 were relatively few in this study (19 percent).

4.2.3.2 Educational status

In terms of educational status, 19 percent had less than a high school education, while 22 percent had high school education. Those with high school and tertiary education constituted approximately 50 percent, while 9 percent of respondents had professional/vocational/technical

training. The data indicates the fair representation of people with diverse background.


Figure 5: Educational Status of Respondents



Source: Authors' Compilation

4.2.3.3 Residential Status

Figure 6: Residential Status of Respondents



Source: Authors' Compilation

For this study, it was crucial to have an idea of the residential status of the respondents. Receiving responses from a larger majority who are natives of the area helps to reduce errors and wrong information and also provides a clearer picture of what the real situations are. Also, the blending of responses from natives and migrants to the areas enriches the narratives in a way that reduces biasness. Data from the chart above shows that natives constitute a greater portion of the respondents than migrants and others. Specifically, about 78 percent of the respondents were natives. The remaining 22 percent were made up of migrants.

4.2.4 Responses


4.2.4.1 Education

Education is globally acknowledged as an important indicator for measuring development. Some previous studies have opined that decentralisation has a positive effect on education. Empirically, some research has shown improved education outcomes as results of decentralisation (Simatupang, (2009), Qibthiyyah, (2008), Faguet, (2004)). Studies, such as Faguet and Sánchez (2006), sought to investigate the effect of decentralisation on educational outcomes in Bolivia and Colombia and argued that decentralisation improved public school enrolment.

As a result, respondents were asked a number of questions to establish the impact of the creation of district on education. These questions were:

1. Has access to education improved?
2. Has quality of education also increased?

Figure 7: Responses to the question: 'Has access to education improved?'



Source: Authors' Compilation

Though a reasonable percentage of the respondents (43 percent) agreed to the statement that access


to education has improved, interestingly, 32 percent of respondents admitted they were indifferent. Also, 24 percent out of the total disagreed to the assertion, “access to education has improved”. The number of indifferent respondents, together with the number that disagreed to the assertion that access to education has improved, gives a hint on the state of access to education in the various districts and other decentralised units.

Access to education, among other factors, is generally influenced by two main elements; cost and infrastructure (Mooney and French, 2016). However, with the implementation of free public education at the basic levels, it is tempting to suggest that this figure depicts the general paucity in schools’ infrastructure. In Ghana, most children, especially those living in rural areas are compelled to travel long distances every morning before accessing basic classrooms (Acheampong et al, 2007). Also, in some circumstances where infrastructure has been provided, lack of teachers, high poverty and inadequate learning materials remain a challenge (Ampratwum and Agyei, 2014).

4.2.4.2 Educational quality

The issue of education cannot be analysed without observing the quality aspect, as it reflects in the outcomes, such as pass rate. In the quest to gauge the perspective on the quality level of education, respondents were asked whether the quality of education has improved. Once again, the results from the data obtained follow the same trajectory as responses from the question on access to education. 43 percent of respondents admitted quality had improved, 17 percent were indifferent and 40 percent disagreed.

Figure 8: Responses to the question: 'Has quality of education improved?'



Source: Authors' Compilation

Additionally, data was taken on the number of schools in the districts from 2004-2016. With the exception of Oforikrom, Sissala West in 2011-2012 and West Mamprusi in 2008, less than ten schools were built in the districts each year.

Table 8: Number of Schools Built in Selected Districts (2004-2016)

Year	Adenta	Asokore Mampong	Central Tongu	Jaman North	Oforikrom	Sissala West	Tamale South	Twifo/Hemang/Lower Denkyira	West Mamprusi
2004			0		31	0			2
2005			0		18	0			3
2006			0		7	3			5
2007			0		19	2			7
2008			0		19	0			17
2009			0		22	0		0	8
2010	3		2		7	0		0	5

2011			3		10	13		4	2
2012	1		3		8	11		3	2
2013	2	2	0		6	1		1	2
2014	2	2	0		9	1		1	2
2015		5	2		5	7		3	3
2016	1	4	0		3	2		2	8

Source: Various MMDAs and the District Education Directorate in the districts

4.2.4.3 Health


On the issue of health, two critical questions were asked:

1. Over the past decade, have there been an increase in the number of health facilities enough to cater the health needs of the community?
2. Do the facilities have the needed equipment to deliver effectively?

Results/answers from the aforementioned questions have been displayed Figure 9.

Responses from the first question were mixed. Data from Adenta in the Greater Accra Region and Asawase in the Ashanti Region, revealed a greater proportion of respondents (58 percent from Adenta, 76 percent from Asawase region) indicated that there had not been an increase in the number of health facilities in the district over the last decade , although official government records suggests otherwise (see Table 9). Other areas, such as Sissala West, Central Tongu, West Mamprusi and the Jaman North districts had an opposite opinion, where the majority said that the number of health facilities had actually increased. Responses from Tamale South posed an interesting picture, as the majority of respondents expressed their uncertainty about whether the number of health facilities had indeed increased or not.

Figure 9: Responses to the question: 'Has there been an increase in the number of health facilities over the past decade?'




Source: Authors' Compilation

When respondents were asked about the state of health equipment, which would imply whether it was adequate to support health care delivery, 56 percent of the total respondents disagreed that the amount of health equipment in the various health facilities was adequate. This does not come as a surprise considering the state of healthcare in the country, where basic equipment like hospital beds, incubators and ambulances are scarcely available (Citifmonline (2017); Myjoyonline.com (2017)). There have been reports of instances where patients, including pregnant women, are compelled to sleep on the floor for lack of empty beds (Myjoyonline.com (2017)).

Figure 10: Responses to the question: 'Do the health facilities have the required equipment and

facilities?'



Source: Authors' Compilation

4.2.4.4 Number of Health Facilities in Districts⁷

From the data collected from the MMDAs on the number of health facilities, it appears that, with the exception of Oforikrom and West Mamprusi, every district had at least 20 health facilities by 2016. This indicates a worrying trend in health service delivery, as West Mamprusi has about twice the population size as Twifo Hemang/Lower Denkyira (121,009 people in West Mamprusi compared to 55,131 people in Twifo Hemang/Lower Denkyira) but the latter district has more health facilities than the former (20 in Twifo Hemang/Lower Denkyira compared to 15 in West Mamprusi). Central Tongu, Sissala West and Adenta had the greatest increases in the number of healthcare facilities in their areas. Central Tongu increased from one health facility in 2004 to 39 in 2016, Sissala West had four health facilities in 2004 compared to 26 in 2016, whilst Adenta,

⁷ Health facilities include: hospitals, clinics, health centres, CHPS compounds and others

had 12 facilities in 2011 which increased to 47 by 2016. Central Tongu and Sissala West had two of the highest rates of respondents surveyed answering that there had been an increase in the number of health facilities in the district. However, the majority of respondents answered that there had not been an increase in the number of health facilities in the district over the decade. Juxtaposing the response from Sissala West District with available data (see Table 9) indeed confirms the assertion that the number of health facilities have increased by 550 percent between the years 2004 and 2016. Interestingly, there appears to be no visible relationship between the year of the districts creation and the number of health facilities.

Table 9: Number of health facilities in Selected Districts (2004-2016)

Year	Adenta	Asokore Mampong	Central Tongu	Jaman North	Oforikrom	Sissala West	Tamale South	Twifo/Hemang / Lower Denkyira	West Mamprusi
2004			1		7	4	22		4
2005			1		7	4	21		6
2006			1		7	5	23		6
2007			1		7	5	20		7
2008			1		7	6	33		7
2009			1		7	11	33		7
2010			1		7	11	33	16	8
2011	12		1		14	11	31	16	9
2012	12		1	1	14	13	21	20	11
2013	14	19	22	33	15	14	21	20	14
2014	19	21	24	33	15	14	21	20	14

2015	47	24	26	38	16	15	21	20	14
2016	47	36	33	39	16	26	23	20	15

Source: Authors' Compilation based on Data from Districts, Municipal and Metropolitan Health Directorate.

4.3 Objective Three: To analyse the degree to which MPs' representation in parliament of the new constituencies created out of new districts in 2004 aligned with their mandate by assessing whether MPs successfully lobbied the National Government through Ministers question time; Public Statements on the floor of Parliament; the Government Assurances Committee and other Parliamentary tools, to ensure representation and to plug development shortfalls in their constituencies.

The promotion of good governance requires a parliament that can effectively perform the three cardinal functions of representation, oversight regarding the Executive, and law making. The ability to control public expenditure will be good service to citizens. As part of the representational mandate, an elected group of individuals represent the interests, desires and needs of their constituents. MPs (and governments) must, therefore, be accountable to the people. Representational democracy is practiced in Ghana, where citizens participate in national decision-making solely through elections and not continuously, as is the case in participatory democracy. This places great importance on the public's choice of representation. To effectively choose, citizens need to be informed about what their representatives (MPs) do in Parliament.

In the absence of information on government assurances, committee work and other parliamentary tools, the study focused on contributions on the floor of Parliament and specific questions to Ministers to examine the effectiveness of MPs from newly created constituencies. These served as proxies for making a determination on the effectiveness of an MP as a representative.

4.3.1 Descriptive Data

The data collected spans eight years, covering two terms of MPs' tenure (2005-2008 and 2009-2012). A total of 12 MPs, comprising 11 men and a woman were selected from 10 newly created constituencies. Eight constituencies maintained their MPs over the 8-year period, whereas two constituencies changed MPs for each term. The political parties with seats in these constituencies

included the National Democratic Congress (NDC), New Patriotic Party (NPP) and People's National Convention (PNC) - NDC won five seats in the first term and gained an additional seat from the NPP in the second term; NPP had four seats for the first term whereas PNC maintained a single seat over the entire period.

4.3.2 MPs' Contributions

Contributions by selected MPs were analysed across the years (2005-2012) to establish patterns in their deliberative process. It was found that MPs tend to make fewer contributions at the plenary in the first and last years of their 4-year term. This trend can be attributed to the 'honeymoon' period at the inception of a new Parliament and upcoming elections. Nonetheless, a number of MPs, such as Haruna Iddrisu (MP, Tamale South), Alhaji Mubarak Muntaka (MP, Asawase), Joe Gidisu (ex-MP, Central Tongu) and Joe Ghartey (MP, Essikado Ketan) appear to have personality and procedural advantage over their colleagues. Comparatively, they have contributed immensely to bill amendments, purchase and loan agreements, public expenditure issues and policy related matters in addition to questioning of Ministers.

It was also observed that Reverend Benjamin Bimpong Donkor (ex-MP, Hemang Lower Denkyira) and Ms. Elizabeth Agyeman (ex-MP, Oforikrom), for reasons unknown, made very few contributions on the floor of Parliament during their tenure in Parliament (per the records captured in the Parliamentary Hansards). 20 percent of the 10 constituencies that changed MPs saw an improvement in the quantity of contributions their MPs make. For instance, Alhaji Mubarak Muntaka (MP, Asawase) made a total of 1,391 statements related to bill amendments, public expenditure, business of the house and correction of votes and proceedings, to mention a few, within a 4-year term against marginal statements by his predecessor Mr. Gibril Adamu during his 4-year term.

4.3.3 Data on Frequency of Contributions by MPs

Table 10: Mr. Joe Ghartey (MP, Essikado Ketan)

MP	Year	Statement Counts	Context
Mr. Joe Ghartey	2005	18	Bill Amendments Suspension of Standing Order Annual Estimates Purchase/Loan Agreements Questions/Answers Report Amendments Statements
	2006	34	
	2007	57	
	2008	15	
	2009	62	
	2010	131	
	2011	157	
	2012	43	
TOTAL		517	

Source: Hansards (2005-2012)

Table 11: Rev. Benjamin Bimpong Donkor (ex-MP, Hemang Lower Denkyira)

MP	Year	Statement Counts	Context
Rev. Benjamin Bimpong Donkor	2005	8	Questions to Ministers
	2006	0	n/a
	2007	7	Points of Order
	2008	0	n/a
	2009	0	n/a
	2010	0	n/a
	2011	0	n/a
	2012	0	n/a
TOTAL		15	

Source: Hansards (2005-2012)

Table 12: Mr. Kwadwo Opare-Hammond (MP, Adentan)

MP	Year	Statement Counts	Context
Mr. Kwadwo Opare-Hammond	2005	29	Annual Estimates Purchase/Loan Agreements Correction of Votes and Proceedings Report Amendments Statements Bill Amendments Questions/Answers Government Financial Policy
	2006	47	
	2007	26	
	2008	15	
	2009	n/a	
	2010	n/a	
	2011	n/a	
	2012	n/a	
TOTAL		117	

Source: Hansards (2005-2012)

Table 13: Mr. Kojo Adu-Asare (ex-MP, Adentan)

MP	Year	Statement Counts	Context
Kojo Adu-Asare	2005	0	n/a
	2006	0	n/a
	2007	0	n/a
	2008	0	n/a

	2009	13	Statement Bill Amendments Questions/Answers
	2010	3	
	2011	21	
	2012	3	
TOTAL		40	

Table 14: Mr. Joe Gidisu (ex-MP, Central Tongu)

MP	Year	Statement Counts	Context
Mr. Joe K. Gidisu	2005	130	Annual Estimates Bill Amendments Statements Questions/Answers Business of the House Government's Financial Annual Estimates Report Amendments Correction of Votes and Proceedings
	2006	165	
	2007	59	
	2008	51	
	2009	198	
	2010	234	
	2011	255	
	2012	32	
TOTAL		1,124	

Source: Hansards (2005-2012)

Table 15: Ms. Elizabeth Agyeman (ex-MP, Oforikrom)

MP	Year	Statement Counts	Context
Ms. Elizabeth Agyeman	2005	0	Statements
	2006	1	
	2007	5	
	2008	0	
	2009	0	
	2010	0	
	2011	0	
	2012	0	
TOTAL		6	

Source: Hansards (2005-2012)

Table 16: Mr. Gibril Adamu (ex-MP, Asawase)

MP	Year	Statement Counts	Context
Adamu M Gibril	2005	0	n/a
	2006	0	
	2007	0	
	2008	0	
	2009	n/a	
	2010	n/a	
	2011	n/a	
	2012	n/a	

Source: Hansards (2005-2012)

Table 17: Alhaji Mubarak Muntaka (MP, Asawase)

MP	Year	Statement Counts	Context
Alhaji Mubarak Muntaka	2005	n/a	
	2006	n/a	
	2007	n/a	
	2008	n/a	
	2009	28	Annual Estimates Bill Amendments Statements Questions/Answers Business of the House Government's Financial Annual Estimates Report Amendments Correction of Votes and Proceedings
	2010	149	
	2011	567	
	2012	647	
TOTAL		1,391	

Source: Hansards (2005-2012)

Table 18: Mr. Alexander Asum-Ahensah (ex-MP, Jaman North)

MP	Year	Statement Counts	Context
Alexander Asum-Ahensah	2005	9	Statements Questions/Answers Corrections of Votes and Proceedings
	2006	12	
	2007	15	

	2008	0	
	2009	7	
	2010	17	
	2011	45	
	2012	18	
TOTAL		123	

Source: Hansards (2005-2012)

Table 19: Mr. Haruna Iddrisu (MP, Tamale South)

MP	Year	Statement Counts	Context
Mr. Haruna Iddrisu	2005	216	Bill Amendments Purchase/Loan Agreements Suspension of Standing Order Annual Estimates Business of the House Correction of Official Reports Report Amendments Statements Government Financial Policy Questions/Answers
	2006	433	
	2007	298	
	2008	275	
	2009	175	
	2010	182	
	2011	405	
	2012	48	
TOTAL		2,032	

Source: Hansards (2005-2012)

Table 20: Mr. Alidu Iddrisu Zakari (ex-MP, Walewale)

MP	Year	Statement Counts	Context
Mr. Alidu I. Zakari	2005	4	Questions/Answers Statements
	2006	0	
	2007	1	
	2008	0	
	2009	0	
	2010	0	
	2011	0	

	2012	3	
TOTAL		8	

Source: Hansards (2005-2012)


Table 21: Mr. Harunah Bayirga (ex-MP, Sissala West)

MP	Year	Statement Counts	Context
Mr. Harunah H. Bayirga	2005	7	Statements Questions/Answers
	2006	6	
	2007	1	
	2008	2	
	2009	2	
	2010	15	
	2011	12	
	2012	5	
TOTAL		50	

Source: Hansards (2005-2012)

4.3.4 Representational mandate of MPs

Figure 11: Frequency and clustering of MPs' interventions



Source: Odekro (2017)

Figure 15 summarises the interventions of MPs into the three main clusters - *representation, legislation and oversight of the executive*. Most of the MPs contributions were frequently in relation to public policy matters, Questions to Ministers of State on constituency-specific challenges, ceremonial speeches and motions, giving representation the highest frequency of 69 percent. Specific to the representation cluster, these interventions pertain to infrastructure related projects, such as schools, roads, hospitals, telecommunications, water and electricity. However, this does not necessarily mean quality representation (because we did not track government response to the concerns) but generally speaks to the salience of the interventions.

It is unclear whether expansion in the number of MPs necessarily improves the quality of representation, except for the theoretical justification that it brings government closer to the people. There is an interplay of factors which might account for local development in newly created constituencies. The first range of factors are internal and were alluded to earlier - personality of the MP and procedures of Parliament (an MP who is familiar with the processes of Parliament and understands its internal dynamics has a greater chance of successfully lobbying to get speaking time). The second range of factors are external and has to do with the importance government places on resolving the concerns of the MP. In light of constraints, government has to prioritise local development provision and this decision is sometimes made against political benefits

government (the Executive, specifically) stands to gain. An ideal approach, earlier conceptualised, to examine the effectiveness of an MP in the performance of his/her representative duty, is to examine the extent and timeliness of government response to constituency-related issues through a Minister's promise to address issues and what government actually does. However, reports of the Government Assurance Committee for the period were inaccessible as at the time of the study, thus difficult to trace and establish the influence of an MP in the development process.

5.0 CONCLUSION

A number of key conclusions have arisen from the three objectives studied in this paper. These conclusions should be used to inform future demarcation exercises for the creation of districts and constituencies.

5.1 Objective One

The creation of districts is a means to bring governance closer to the people and facilitate the efficient delivery of public/essential goods and services. The creation of constituencies, on the other hand, is for representational purposes but the study has revealed that there exists some kind of “marriage” between the two, which, to some extent, accounts for the proliferation of constituencies in the country. Most of the experts and stakeholders interviewed called for the capping of both the number of districts and constituencies, while others also advocated for the creation of a separate independent entity that would be in charge of creation of districts and constituencies. The study also revealed that some districts, municipalities and metropolitans created in the past, failed to meet the statutory population requirement yet they were commissioned and granted the legal backing to operate. The creation of local government units, in the past, led to pocket of grievances, inter-community conflicts among others. Reasons accounting for such incidences have included the site of the district capital, the naming of the district, etc.

5.2 Objective Two

Some literature has argued that the creation of districts is important to the development of an area and facilitates the provision of public services to the doorstep of the citizens of Ghana. A significant observation from the regression results was in contrast with the positive effect on development expected from decentralisation. This means there is no guarantee that creating smaller decentralised units will positively affect development or improve the delivery of services in a district. Therefore, the creation of districts, which is currently predominantly based on the increase in population, should take into consideration a multidimensional approach with consideration to local revenue generation capabilities.

Secondly, the importance of the local revenue generation or IGF at the district level is critical to the development and the provision quality public service. The IGF exhibited a significant positive

effect which supports the argument about local revenue generation having positive impact on the delivery of public service. Therefore, the creation of districts, without the required consideration of revenue generation capacity, is likely to lead to slow or low level of development.

Government should consult a wide range of stakeholders, including local residents, governance and legal experts, and ministries, departments and agencies prior to creating districts and subsequently creating constituencies. These perspectives, coupled with feasibility studies should inform the creations and demarcations, rather than political biases. This would lead to less resources being wasted and more financially viable districts which are not as reliant on DACF and government aid.

5.3 Objective Three

Personality and procedural advantages play a significant role in representation. Front-benching MPs who are vocal and/or hold leadership positions in Parliament tend to get more opportunities to speak on the floor of Parliament than their more reserved colleagues. These MPs are further aided by Order 86 (1) of the Standing Orders of Parliament, which requires an MP to ‘catch the eye’ of the Speaker before being given the opportunity to speak at the plenary. In fact, this observation amplifies earlier findings in Odekro’s Sixth Parliament report to the effect that “holding of a leadership position is the most important determinant of the volume of an MP’s contributions to Parliamentary debates.” (Sagoe-Moses, Armah & Sarfo-Kantanka, 2016). This can put considerable restraints on MPs, irrespective of whether they are new or consecutive MPs, who wish to submit concerns of their constituents or follow up on earlier submissions in Parliament. As an example, the personality and procedural factors are made more conspicuous when the substantive statement counts of Joe Ghartey (517), Haruna Iddrisu (2,032), Muntaka Mohammed (1,391) compared to Elizabeth Agyemang (6), Kwadwo Opare-Hammond (117) and Rev. Benjamin Donkor (0) are looked at.

Also, constituencies that changed MPs saw an improvement in the number of substantive interventions made on the floor of Parliament. For instance, Adamu Gibril in his 4-year tenure as MP (2005-2008) did not make any substantive contribution (statement) in Parliament. Essentially constituents of Asawase had little voice in Parliament until his successor, Alhaji Mubarak Muntaka, came to Parliament in 2009 and in his first term, made a total of 1,391 substantive

contributions.

Despite considerable challenges in getting opportunity to speak in Parliament, MPs Question Time remains an effective tool MPs can use to articulate the local development needs of constituents. Following a simple procedure of submitting a question to the Table Office 10 sitting days before the date question will be asked, an MP has a right to ask any Minister of State a question(s). This is an opportunity to follow-up on abandoned/stalled projects in his or her constituency and demand government responsiveness to prevailing dire needs of constituents. Also, women MPs were minimally captured in our shortlist of MPs.

6.0 RECOMMENDATIONS

Based on the major findings of the study and the compilation of Opinions of Experts and major stakeholders interviewed, the following are being recommended:

1. The process of district creation and demarcation has been surrounded with a certain degree of secrecy, thereby inhibiting transparency. Also, the former practice of effectively engaging the populace before creating new districts and constituencies seems to be dying out. This has resulted in community disputes, boundary disputes, among others. It is recommended that the process is made as transparent as possible, with reports on the creation exercise published on Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development (in the case of districts) and that of the Electoral Commission (for constituencies).
2. The twin role of creating constituencies and organising elections of the EC is not out of order, however, the problem of indirect manipulation of the EC by the Executive must be critically looked at. Organising fair elections commences with equitable distribution of constituencies. Therefore, the EC should not be forced to create new constituencies in the event that districts are politically created (when it does not meet the stipulated criteria) to warrant a new constituency. In actual fact, the law calls for redemarcation and not necessarily creating new ones.
3. The population growth debate, which has been fuelling the increase in the number of districts, must also be given a reassessed. Districts that have grown beyond their required threshold must be elevated to municipality and metropolitan status instead of splitting them.
4. The grey areas in the laws governing the creation of districts and constituencies must be amended. For instance, the law that prevents one person from being a member of two district assemblies must be amended and exemptions should be allowed to be made. The law has “forced” the EC to create some constituencies in past, which could not have been if such law was non-existent. The obvious reason is that Members of Parliament are ex-officio members of the districts which falls within the area they represent. The day-to-day operations of MPs are not closely linked to that of the districts hence must be allowed to members of more than one or their membership at the assemblies should be abolished

altogether.

5. There have been several proposals in the past to delineate the MPs' Common Fund from the DACF by setting a Constituency Development Fund while others have challenged the legality of the MPs Common Fund. Also, the incumbent government have started tying some developmental projects along constituency lines through their popular *One Million per Constituency Programme*. On another leg, Development Authorities have been created to facilitate development in the various belts that have been created. Therefore, it will be useful if the MPs Common Fund is scrapped.
6. Though proceedings might drag and run into chaos should the Speaker allow the 275 MPs to speak on the floor of Parliament, it has also become necessary to liberalise the order of precedence during debates to enable relatively more MPs to partake in the legislative process. Alternatively, Parliamentary Committees can depart from the current Chatham House⁸ style of producing most of its reports (with the exception of national security matters) or strike a balance between that and a more comprehensive report which allows for disaggregation of MPs' inputs at the committee level where most of legislative activities take place.

⁸ <https://www.chathamhouse.org/chatham-house-rule>

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